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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of research in cognitive-social psychology has been 
concerned with the proposition that people consistently engage in a process of 
making educated guesses about causes of events. In addition to eumining the 
processes by which people form causal interpretations of the events around 
them, theorists in this tradition have sought to understand the process whereby 
people attribute characteristics, intentions, feelings, alld traits to the objects in 
their social world. Large bodies of research have been devoted to the study of 
such processes, which have been variously referred to as attribution ((elley, 
1967), perception of causality (Taylor & Fiske, 197'). scriptal extension (Abelson, 
1976), alld humall inference (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). A careful reading of the 
theories put forth in ei:plallation of such processes reveals that most of them 
assume a mediat.ional modeling of cognition alld behavior. lo. this thesis, 
however. we would lite to propose all ei:plallation of such processes which 
derives from a predicational (after Rychlat, 1987), rather thall a mediational 
model of cognition. Instead of framing the processes underlying causal 
attribution alld impression formation in terms of various cognitive mechallisms 
which are mediated by environmental stimuli, we will present all alternative 
theoretical explallation of such phenomena based on the assumption that 
people as gents actively endow their social worlds with mealling. We will 
contend that the process through which they do so is neither a mechallistic nor 
a mediated one. but rather one that reflects the capacity to reason both 
demonstratively alld dialectically in framing contexts of mealling. 
1 
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In developing a framework. for understanding attributions in impression 
formation as a predicational rather than a mediational process. we find it 
instructive to mate a distinction between inference and implication. Although 
several authors in the literature do refer to both the drawing of inferences and 
of implications in making category judgments or framing impressions (e.g., 
Abelson. 1969), they typically use the two terms interchangeably and are at best 
unclear about how the two processes might differ. Ultimately. such theorists 
mate recourse to a single fundamental mode of reasoning, a demonstrative one, 
to explain~ styles of reasoning. We would lite to draw a conceptual 
distinction between inference and implication as contrasting modes of 
affirming major premises in a line of reasoning. In elaborating on the nature 
of the inferential and implicational processes, we hope to demonstrate their 
respective grounding in the demonstrative and dialectical modes of reasoning. 
Through characterizing the implicational process as an essentially dialectical 
one, we hope to mate a case for the fundamental role of oppositionality in the 
drawing of implications. After providing a theoretical justification for 
negation as one form of oppositionality, the relationship between negation and 
opposition in the drawing of implications will be eum.ined empirically through 
a series of two studies. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Logical Learning Theory 
yediational versus Predicationa1 Models of Behavior 
.Rychlak (1987) has drawn a distinction between two fundamental models 
of cognition re9resented in the literature, the mediational model and the 
.Predicational model The mediational model of cognition should be a familiar 
one. given that most of the information-9rocessing theories currently in vogue 
are either implicitly or ex9licitly based on such a model. Indeed, "cognitive 
mediation" between the stimulus-res9onse connections of traditional 
behaviorism is one of the foundational .Premises of the cognitive movement, and 
invocation of such .Processes is seen as necessary in .Providing adequate 
ex91a.o.ations for anything but the most sim9le behaviors. Schmidt U976) 
defines an information .Processing theory as one which .Provides "a descri9tion 
of how certain classes of inputs can be 1n.DsforJ1JIHlto yield certain classes of 
outputs" (9.47). 
Thus, in the .Prototypical information .Processing ex91a.o.ation there is a 
presumed .Process underway initially, and in time certain in.Puts are encoded, 
stored, and retrieved (Bower, 1975). The input meanings are always "mediate" 
because they are being conveyed rather than created; in other words meaning 
eiists "out there" in the environment and is only secondarily "ta.ten in" by the 
.reasoning individual. The mediational process itself never constructs or forms 
the input meanings, indeed, it is itself sha9ed by them (Rychlat, 1988). Among 
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thete inputs are items (such as words, images. ptans. schemes, attitudes, etc.) 
that have been formed or "taken in" as early learnings, and which 
consequenUy have an influence on what occurs as behavior proceeds. For 
example. Siegler (1981) discusses how the different problem-solving rules 
which children acquire as they interact with their environment come to 
mediate their behavior in subsequent problem solving situations. and allow for 
the continuing development of more sophisticated problem solving strategies. 
Mediationa.1 models a.re ultimately based on the assumption that the 
cognit.ive apparatus worts in a mechanist.ic fashion. It is because of the 
widespread acceptance of this assumption that Schmidt ( 1976) can assert that 
any information processing theory of mind must be e1pressed in a tanguage 
that can Cat least in principle) be direcUy translated into an e1ecutable 
program., and that an empirica.1 correspondence must exist between at least some 
of the temporally-ordered states of the computation and some of the 
temporally-ordered states of the human process being described by the theory. 
Thus, in such amodel. the contents of the mind mediate between earlier 
influences and tater influences in a stricUy efficient-cause manner. Although 
some authors (e.g., Edelman, 1978) have focused on how the innate 
"hard-wiring" of the braia (or the /llMIJrw ause> constrains the learning 
process. they invariably describe whatever is to eventua.lly constitute a 
"meaning" in the cognitive process underway as something which is brought in 
St1t:011dll.rily, as a product of input or mediated learning. 
As we can see in the explanations ouUined above, there is a confounding 
of co11hJ11l and proCtlSS in a.lmost a.11 information processing accounts of 
cognition. A meaning (content) which is origina.lly taken in as input comes 
subsequenUy to influence the process by which new meanings a.re encoded and 
stored in memory. Higgins. Rholes. and Jones's ( 1977) explanation of their 
findings concerning the attribution of personality traits provides a more 
specific example of a mediation al account of social cognition. In their study, 
subjects read a paragraph describing a young man as having many risky 
hobbies. having a high opinion of his abilities. having few friends, and as 
being unlikely to turn back from a chosen course of action. Before reading the 
paragraph. subjects had participated in a "learning experiment" in which some 
were exposed to the words "adventurous," "self-confident," "independent," and 
"persistent" (adjectives rated as positive in evaluative tone). and others were 
exposed to the words "reckless," "conceited," "aloof," and "stubborn" (adjectives 
rated as negative in evaluative tone). Subjects exposed to the "positive" words 
later evaluated the young man more highly than did those exposed to the 
"negative" words. Higgins et al suggest that this effect was mediated by the 
transient availability of personality "scripts" or "personae" activated by the 
previous exposure to either the positive or negative words. Thus the input 
contents (e.g., "adventurous," "self-confident") were assumed to have 
influenced the subsequent processing of the information contained in the 
paragraph and. ultimately, the subjects' evaluation of the target. 
Mediational accounts are not only invoked to describe the "lower" levels of 
information processing, but are also used in attempting to explain the 
"transcendental" or "higher" reflective properties of cognition. For example, 
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even the development of metacognition, or the knowledge structures that allow 
us to "know what we know" and to understand "how things are supposed to go" 
in cognitive enterprises, is described by many authors (e.g., Flavell, 1977) as 
being mediated by input knowledge which the child gains through cumulative 
eiperience with cognitive tasks. Thus, itseems that. despite Schmidt's (1976) 
call for "an explicit decoupling of knowledge possessed by the system from the 
processes possessed by the system" (p.47) in information processing theories, 
those assuming a mediational model of cognition are unable to avoid invoking 
contents to mediate processes. 
In the predicational model. however, the process of predication is vined 
as fundamental. The predicational theorist suggests that meanings are never 
"out there" in eiperience independent of a person's capacity to frame Ci.e., 
predicate) what "is e1perienced" meaningfully in the first place. Meanings are 
not ta.ten in or "in-put," but are implicitly framed or created. Something lite a 
predication would only occur secondarily in a mediational process, as certain 
arrangements of the input might be affected. In contrast to the mediation.al 
model. the predicationa1 model is based on the assumption that it is the process 
(i.e., that of predication) which determines the contents of cognition and not 
vice versa. Although the contents of cognition framed through predication 
may change across time, the process itself does Alli. change over time. It is 
interesting to note that the concept of ""11orizlllio11, so fundamental to most 
mediational accounts of cognition, is actually an etymological derivative of the 
Gree.t .t6161oniJI, meaning to "predicate." Thus, the historical meaning of 
categorization. was more a.tin to that of J1111dia1111n.aia1 to experience through 
predication or con.teJ:tualization, rather than that of merely mediating 
7 
,re-elisting meanings. In line with its historical meaning. we will employ the 
term pJ"llt/iallio.a to refer to tbe act of a.ffirmm1- dtl.ayi.a1- or 1Jua/i1Ym1 
iJfJM/tlr ptter.as of mnDilll ill relatio.a to .auronr or w1el«I JJ11118r.as of 
IJ#llilll· 
Un.lite mediation, which is thought of as moving over time from 
antecedent inputs to consequent outputs, predication is a logical process which 
occurs "outside" of time. It is logical order and not time that is significant to the 
predicational process. Predication can be thought of as moving from a wider 
contelt of meaning to a narrover contelt, with the latter being enriched by the 
meaning of the former. Thus the predication "Anne is compulsive" or "Anne is 
not compulsive" can be diagrammed via Euler circles, with the wider contelt 
("compulsive people") encircling <i.e., lending meaning to) the specified 
individual(" Anne")--or, excluding her from this contelt altogether. In this 
type of logical (rather than temporal) relationship, it is the predicate (e.g., 
"compulsive") which sets the contelt and hence lends the meaning to the 
"&a.rget" of cognition (e. g., "Anne"). 
The nature of the logical process of predication can perhaps be beUer 
understood through an analogy to the logical relationships which eDst within 
the domain of mathematics. Dirichlet's original definition of the mathematical 
function (e.g .. f(z)•y) was U1 in terms of an efficient causal relationship which 
occurs within time (as changing values in the variable "x" provide the impetus 
for changes in the variable "y"), but in terms of a formal cause patternin& 
between the two variables. Thus, the relationship or connection between 
variables was given by definition. What occurs in the act of predication can be 
understood in a similar way. Just as the dependent variable "y" is situated 
8 
yithiJl a context which Wl!li.il meanin& (i.e., the function which describes it), 
a predication frames the context n meanin& for any "target" or "item" of 
cognition. This is a relationship which is immediately given, and thus does not 
rely on the notion that meaning derives from spatio-temporal association of 
previously unrelated thoughts or ideas. The essentially extratemporal, formal 
cause nature of the functional relationship has typically been obscured within 
mediational theories, which often seek to account for the dependent variable 
(consequent cognitions or behaviors) in terms of the independent variable 
(aatecedent input) which impels cognition along in an efficient-cause manner. 
In order to describe behavior from within a predicational model, we must 
think about our data (i.e., people) from lh!ir co1nitiye perspective rather than 
looking "at" them "over there" as if they were under the directing impulsions of 
environmental stimulations. If we assume that an individual lt.Adl meaning to 
experience through the process of predication, then a meaoin1ful 
understanding of cognition must derive from an iDtrospecliYB perspective. In 
contrast, if we assume that meaning is mechanically mediated by pre-existing 
cognitive structures or sets (e.g., attitudes) and environmental variables which 
determine which structures will be activated and what will be encoded (e.g., 
salience or vividness of information), then we needn't concern ourselves about 
viewing our data introspectively. We have a prototype example of the difference 
between introspective and extraspective theorizing in the work of Jones & 
Nisbett (1971), who found essentially that when we look "at" people behaving we 
are likely to assign extra-personal influences (e.g., traits) to them, acting as 
mediators of their behavior. On the other hand, when we look "with" people--at 
the problem facing them--we are likely to assign predicating grounds or 
9 
,..sons to their course of behavior. 
£1t,ra5pective formulations of behavioral or cognitive "mechanisms" are 
teiion. We have already suggested that. information processing and related 
coinitive network theories are of this type. For example, in Wyer & Carlston's 
(1979) associative network account of impression formation, memory is 
described as organized in a network of nodes (representing "concepts"), each of 
which are connected to other nodes by one or more "paths." The diameter of 
each path. which represents the strength of association, is determined both by 
the frequency and recency of its usage Cibid., pp. 71-73). This is clearly an 
11traspective description, and within this model a knowledge of the influence of 
past associations on the strength and direction of learning is all we need to 
understand the basic process underlying impression formation. Given that. they 
are construing the mind as a reasoning "machine," it mates no sense for Wyer 
and Carlston to "anthropomorphize" such a machine by considering what. 
unique predications it might be bringing to bear in the situation at. hand. 
Several theorists within the cognitive tradition have found such 
mechanistic descriptions inadequate to account for many attribution and 
impression formation phenomena, and have turned to more introspective styles 
of theorizing in an attempt to capture what. the mechanistic accounts may be 
missing. One significant example of such theorizing is Tversky and 
Kahneman 's theory of judgmental heuristics. In their model, Tversty and 
Kahneman eiplore several strategies that. permit or encourage perceivers to go 
beyond the information given in forming judgments about social situations. 
They ouUine several "heuristics" or cognitive biases that. seem to influence the 
inferences or implications people mate in a variety of situations. What. mates 
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tvers.kY and Kabneman 's judgment heuristics model an introspective one is the 
fact that. in order to know what a subject "processes" as relevant information, 
ve must understand his or her predicating assumptions and idiosyncratic 
evaluations of what is under examination. Tversky and Iabneman (197.C; see 
aJso Kabneman & Tversky, 1972; Iabneman, Slovic, & Tverst.y, 1982) find that 
people do not reason with mechanistic precision, nor do they reason the way a 
statistician reasons. The person's imagination and mood can, for eiample. 
influence an estimation of the proper category judgments to apply to some 
problem. 
What Tversk.y and Iabneman are attempting to address is how, once we 
recognize that the individual is not simply a "dutiful clerk who passively 
registers items of information" (NisbeU & Ross, 1980, p. 17), we can understand 
the process by which individuals resolve ambiguities, mate guesses about 
events that cannot be observed directly, or even distort their eiperience. Of 
course, as we will see below, many theorists pay lip service to the need to 
eiplain such phenomena and several mate serious attempts to incorporate such 
eiplanations into their theories. However. as most are models trapped within 
eltraspective, mechanistic forms of explanation, they ultimately end up 
begging the question they set out to answer. 
Inference and Implication in the PredicatioAal Model 
As outlined above, we are assuming that the predicational process is 
logical in nature. The notion of predication as a lo&ical process can actua11y be 
traced bact to early Greek philosophy where, as previously noted, rational 
patterns of meaning or co.a.tens were referred to as categories or predicates. 
Thus, to predicate meant to bring meaning to bear consistent with a given 
11 
context or logos. We intend to use the termlukin a.n equivalentma.nner; that 
is. as HUi&. concerned J!Wl. .IAl padiflllltd alllio11s/JiJtbeWeen &ml a,mo.01 
~nceptual meani.011. Al:ul .iA. particular J!Wl. .IAl extension n lllSll meaoinas 
.L1>rou1h inference &ml implication. 
AristoUe, who is often referred to as "the father of logic.'' was particularly 
concerned with ouUining the factors underlying our accepta.nce or rejection of 
propositions about our experience (Rychla.k, 1981 ). As a part of this project, he 
drew a distinction between two types of reasoning or ways of extending 
mea.ning which will be instructive for our purposes. He called one such form of 
mea.ning-eltension demonstrative. describing it as reasoning from premises 
that "are true a.nd primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has 
originally come through premises vhich are primary a.nd true" (AristoUe, 1952. 
p. 1'43). Premises typically accepted as demonstratively certain are usually 
definitions such as "All bachelors are unmarried males," in which one ca.n 
determine the truth value a.nalytically Ci. e .. through internal examination) or 
"The sun produces heat," in which case one ca.n observe empirically the 
(synthetical) relationship between something called the sun a.nd how it should 
be predicated (e.g., hot, not cold). 
Logicia.ns within the tradition of analytic philosophy have historically 
been most concerned with this type of reasoning - reasoning that begins with 
self-evident propositions or propositions vhose truth value ca.n be determined 
by empirical mea.ns. Ma.ny of the early information-processing theorists looted 
to this body of literature for the theorems necessary to model huma.n reasoning 
through use of computer a.nalogs CHastie, 1983). Thus, machine simulations of 
huma.n reasoning have from the outset been simulations of demonstrative 
reasoning. The current literature continues to reflect this preoccupation, as 
JDost theories are directed towards understanding how various cognitive 
structures and processes might interact to account for the products of 
demonstrative reasoning (e.g., Abelson, 1976; Braine, 1978; johnson-Lalrd, 
1983). 
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Given their preoccupation with the development of knowledge structures 
111d forms of reasoning which can be simulated mechanically, it is perhaps not 
surprising that many of the information processing models ignore the question 
of man individual comes to accept a proposition as "primary and true" or how 
111 individual reasons from propositions whose "truth values" are uncertain or 
unclear. In the few attempts to account for the process by which people arrive 
at conclusions based on uncertain, ambiguous, or tentative premises (e.g., 
Abelson & Reich, 1969; Mactie, 197-f), such theorists inevitably invoke the 
influence of some mediating mechanism which determines whether an 
individual accepts a particular proposition as "given" or "true." As described 
above, a "thinking" machine accepts "input" as primary and true, unless 
instructed to do otherwise by an input set of rules, which themselves must be 
accepted as primary and true, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, computer !ukil 
essentially demonstratjye. 
An important corollary of their 11clusive reliance on demonstrative 
accounts of human reasoning is that information processing models are 
constrained to descriptions of a unipolar intelligence. In such models, 
meanings are always input as discrete bits of unipolar information, which are 
only subsequently combined according to scripts, processing rules, templates, 
etc. to form more comple1 "meanings" such as categories or increasingly 
13 
etabOrated scripts. Thus, bipolarity of meaning or opposit,ionality is never 
intrinsic to such systems, but can only arise as a secondary by-product of the 
joining oftwo unipolar meanings according to some processing rule. For 
eumple, in the nodal network theory outlined above (Wyer & Carlston, 1979), 
cognitive mediation is assumed to be fundamentally unipolar and 
unidirectional. Paths connecting, say, two nodes in the network are initially 
unidirectional; if two concepts are to be associated one with the other, m paths 
,,0uld have to be formed between the nodes (Rychlak, 1988). Constrained as 
they are to the use of mechanistic metaphors, such theorists lose the essence of 
1t'hat Aristotle recognized as the very human ability to reason from premises 
that were not taken as unipolar or demonstratively given. 
As Aristotle pointed out, individuals are also capable off raming their 
experience dialectically. He described such a process as reasoning from 
"opinion," or from premises reflecting cultural biases or idiosyncratic personal 
values rather than demonstrative "truth." In this sense, he characterized 
dialectical reasoning as reasoning from a premise framed somewhere along a 
pro versus con RAH of attitude or affective assessment. Rychlak ( 1987) has 
retained this sense of dialectical reasoning as reasoning along oppositional 
dimensions or ranges of meaning in his predicational model of cognition, 1fhile 
discarding the notion of such reasoning as based merely on opinion. 
Rychlak Cl988) has not only retained the notion of dialectical reasoning, 
but has convincingly argued that dialectical logic or oppositionality is 
funda.mental to cognition. This is so because, as many authors have 
demonstrated (e.g., Hormann, 1981; Rommetveit, 1974) meaning only exists, or is 
generated, within a relation or context. As Mackie (1974) states, humans possess 
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a capacity for "imacinative transfer" (p. '7) or the the creation of meaning 
through an implicit understanding both of what is and is not present in a given 
causal field or context. What Mackie seems to be ref erring to here is •hat Ye 
yould describe as the uniquely human ability to reason oppositioalllly, or to 
draw predications along oppositional dimensions or ranges of meaning. 
Oppositionality is at the root of the construction of" causal fields" or 
attributions, for in a context of meaning the widest possible alternatives occur 
betYeen what "is" the case and what "is not" the case. The predication must be 
selected from this broad context. To phrase it another Yay, to have an 
understanding of the meaning of (for example) a situation, sentence, or text 
depends on having an understanding of Yhat is an present in the situation or 
.rull: "meant" by the sentence or text. Given this model, which pole of a 
bipolarity or oppositional dimension is affirmed or singled out for 
identification is up to the individual and not the environment. Thus. •hen 
people are reasoning dialectically, the major premise framing a line of thought 
is not affirmed as "primary and true," but as a starting point for variations in 
meaning, leading a•ay from the initially framed meaning to various 
possibilities framed ultimately by its very opposite meanings. 
These two contrasting yays of extending meaning are reflected in a 
distinction often made by philosophers betYeen inference and implication (cf., 
Reese, 1980). Inference is typically defined as Lilt process yhereby Lilt 
reasoner derins conclusions f.mm premises lllllm.:J.cu.1.:--yhich means utt 
Ul.&LLht reasoner presumes .Lb.ua.W..H.k.111. (Reese. 1980, p. 2'2; Runes, 1960. 
p.146). Thus. an inferential process occurs when a person affirms a aiven 
predication. reasoning in accordance with the belief that the meaning-relation 
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expressed in the premise is the only one which obtains. In contrast, implicat.ioa 
occurs when i lill J!f thoucht ii. extended mm .m.a.iat: premises .Lllll l.fil 
grtainty:,,m.su1cestive. grm.derived .in.ttentative fashion. Thisis in line 
with AristoUe's point about dialectical reasoning; that is, when we take on a 
major premise as an opinion H. e., dialectically) we are drawing from a wider 
range or dimension of meaning than •hen we take on a major premise 
demonstratively, in which case we fail to see the "other" side. Thus, the logic of 
implication is essentially the logic of oppositionality. 
Thus. when a premise is viewed as certain (i.e .. demonstratively fi1ed), the 
range of meaning available from which conclusions might be drawn is 
narrowed and the flow of thought which occurs is unipolar or unidirectional. 
For eu.mple, if a statement is made to the effect that "Michael is generous," then 
we would .iAiu. from this that he enjoys sharing his possessions and his time 
with others, is liberal with his funds, and so on. On the other hand, when we 
are confronted with a premise which is uncertain, is suggestive, or whose 
meaning tacts clarity, the range of meaning available from which we miaht 
eventually draw a conclusion is much broader. So, if we were to ask what is 
implied in the statement "Michael is generous," we would have to frame a 
hypothesis about Michael based, not on what is stated e1pliciUy in the premise, 
but on the possibilities of meaning it points to or leaves open for question. In 
this case, there a number of conclusions that we miaht draw. A "clinical" 
conclusion that could be drawn is that Michael is insecure, that he seeks to aain 
friendship and bolster his self-esteem through givina away his things, loanina 
money, and so on. 
This is not a flatterina implication, even though it takes root from a 
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positive initiating premise. A reverse scenario might be obtained when 
beginning with the predication "All politicians are untrustworthy." The 
inference here would be that politicians often fail to uphold their pro.mises, 
may seek public office to attain selfish ends, and so on. However, an implication 
derived from this premise might be that, since politicians are confronted with 
so many competing demands, and because their control over formulation and 
implementation of public policy is typically limited, that they often fall prey to 
forces beyond their control. 
We are not suggesting that the implications we have outlined above are 
necessarily the most valid ones or the only ones that could be framed from the 
given pre.mises. However. they do exemplify what we feet to be an important 
factor in understanding the nature of social cognition and impression 
formation, namely that the process of drawing implications is grounded in the 
individual's ability to consider a broad range of possible meanings which, in 
turn is based on the individual's ability to reason dialectica11y as well as 
demonstratively. Thus, we assert that dialectical logic plays an important role 
when an individual must mate an attribution or form. an impression based on 
an implication from. a premise whose meaning is left open to question. lfwe do 
not accept a premise as demonstratively given, the conclusions ultimately 
drawn derive from. an oppositional broadening or extending of the contest in 
which we are considering the premises. Since dialectical logic is based on an 
implicit oppositional tie to the meaning framed in a premise, it follows that such 
oppositionality would play an important role in the drawing of implications. 
Ogden U967) has .noted that Aristotle him.self was "obssessed by the 
problem. of opposition which appears in different forms in a11 his worts, 
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mou1h the special treatise vhich he devoted to it has not su"ived" (p. 21 ). 
Aristotle stressed that for any idea a contrary (opposite) idea could be framed. 
Indeed. one of his principles of association in thought vas that of cont.rast. or 
oppositionality (Esper. 1973). In his elaboration on the nature of oppositionality 
15 it relates to cognition. Rychlak ( 1988) has outlined a typology of oppositional 
relationships vhich includes three forms of conceptual oppositionality: 
contrariety, contradiction. and negation. Contrariety can be seen in the 
contrarY relationship betveen premises such as "All I is true" and "No I is true." 
Contradiction is manifest in the relation betveen premises of the sort "All I is 
true" and "At least this one Xis not true." The case of negation derives from the 
relationship betveen premises of the sort "Xis the case" and "I is not the case." 
Although contradiction and contrariety clearly reflect oppositionality, 
negation. since it does not explicity state or refer to the opposite. presents a 
more subtle case of oppositionality. Hovever. negation (i.e .. "Xis not the case") 
does prompt a broadening or reassessing of the assumed context, a broadening 
vhich ve feel often occurs along oppositional dimensions. In the present. 
thesis, ve are interested in examining specifically the assertion that in 
reasoning from a negation, ve must draw implications rather than inferences. 
and, since a negation frames an oppositional relation. that implications drawn 
from premises framed as negations will often reflect a meaning opposite to that 
being negated in the premise. 
For example, assume that a subject. was presented with the following 
statement, encompassing a certain predication of a person named john: 
"John never takes his shirt off in public." 
To invite the drawing of an implication we might now offer the following 
explanations: 
"john catches cold easily." 
"John sunburns easily." 
"john is ashamed of his physique." 
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All three of these statements are reasonable hypotheses explaining john's 
behavior. However. the third alternative is the clearest. opposite in meaning to 
the premise being negated in the initial predication. People take their shirts 
off in public. There is a certain amount of cullurally-defined exhibitionism 
present in such behavior. Hence, if someone DttVllr exhibits in this fashion, it 
is plausible to think that he has "litUe or nothing" to exhibit. 11 e see that the 
initial statement sets the context for thinking about John's behavior along the 
dimension ranging from people who frequently remove their shirts in public to 
those who never manifest. such behavior. Although we recognize that people do 
not always reason to the opposite in drawing implications, we believe that the 
broadening of the coo.ten suggested by the negation is often litely to occur 
along oppositional dimensions. The fact that john DttVllr takes off his shirt. in 
public suggests that his reasons are not merely pragmatic ones, and it may be 
implied that he is ashamed of his physique. Of course. the implication we have 
been considering concerning john's motives is quite subtle--or, let us call it 
indirect. A more direct form of implication can be seen in the following: 
"Karen's face reflected an emotional mood, but it was not happiness." 
The possible implications might be: 
"Karen Y&Sangry." 
"Karen was bored." 
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"Iaren was sad." 
The antonym of happy is sad, so this meaning can be reasoned to in a more 
"direct" sense. It follows that it should be easier to draw an implication when 
direct items a.re being used than when indirect items a.re being used. The 
subject reasons from the meaning of one word to its opposite (antonym) and 
does not have to frame intermediate steps, as is the case with the indirect items. 
Empirical Research on Social Inference and Implication 
Despite the fact that the term soci6.l .iaf11rt1.aetJ is commonly used to ref er 
to a well-researched a.rea of cognitive-social psychology, most theoretical 
treatments of the topic fail to clearly articulate what it means to say that a social 
judgment or impression is the result of an inferential process. As will become 
apparent in the paragraphs that follow, the typically "loose" and 
all-encompassing use of the term .iaf11rt1.aetJ ultimately mates for several 
problematic ambiguities in the literature. We will ultimately argue that the 
distinction we have proposed--that between inference and implicatio.a.--and the 
logic of oppositio.a.ality on which it is grounded could be instructively applied in 
reco.a.struing the processes underlying the formation of social judgments. To 
begin with, however, I will briefly outline what seems to be the prevailing 
general understanding of what it means to talk about social inference, and 
follow this with a comprehensive overview of the reg.a.ant theories employed to 
account for social inference processes. 
Hastie U983) suggests that there are three broad theoretical positions 
represented in the literature on social inference and attribution: information 
integration theory (A.a.derso.a., 1980, information processing theories (e. a .. 
Wyer & Carlston, 1979; Bower, 197'). and judgment heuristics (Tversty & 
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Iahneman, 1974). It is important to note that theorists representative of ea.ch of 
these positions (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; Hastie, 1983; Wyer& Carlston, 1979) 
have in common a characterization of most forms of reasoning as grounded in 
the process of drawing inferences. Johnson-Laird U983), for example, asserts 
that reasoning (which he describes as at the "heart of human mentality") 
always requires inferential still (p. 23). The hypothesis that people organize 
beliefs about their social environment according to sy11ogistic principles is not 
new. A syllogistic model of belief organization was proposed by McGuire (1960) 
and an extension of it has been developed by Wyer (197', Wyer & Carlston, 1979). 
Even Abelson's (1976) script processing theory characterizes the activation of 
particular scripts as often dependent on higher order, propositional 
(inferential) rules and .knowledge structures CNisbett&Ross, 1980). 
An ewnination of the meaning of inference as it is typically used in the 
social inference literature suggests a general definition common to most 
theories. Johnson-Laird U983) defines inference broadly u the "process of 
thought that leads from one set of propositions to a.not.her ... An Inference is 
valid if there is no interpretation of the premises that is consistent with a denial 
of the conclusion" (pp. 23, 28). Although he echoes the general tenor of 
Johnson-Laird's definition, Hastie's U983) definition is a bit more 
circumscribed: "inference is constituted of three components: a set of 
premises, a conclusion, and rules, principles, templates, or procedures which 
connect the premises to the conclusion in a 'reasonable' manner" (pp. '11-,12). 
In addition, Brody ( 1967) describes an "acceptable" inference u one for which 
the premises afford good reasons to assert, or render certain, the conclusion. 
As we ca.n begin to see already, the theoretical emphuis a.cross these 
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various positions is on social inference as a very demonsttati.ve, unidirectional 
process. Such theorists seem preoccupied with understanding how individuals 
mate "correct" or "acceptable" inferences which flow logically, rationally, or 
"reasonably" from the premises &1l§.[ they have been affirmed as "given" in 
demonstrative fashion. Several authors (e.g .. Collins, 1978; McGuire, 1960; 
Tversky & Iahneman, 1974) do postulate less "rationalistic" models to address the 
question of how individuals reason from ambiguous or uncertain premises, or 
how they might come to accept a premise as having a particular meaning. For 
example, McGuire's (1960) probabilogical model allows for conclusions to be 
more or less probable than they should be based on subjective estimates of their 
desirability. However, most of these theorists seem ultimately to fall back on 
modes of e1planation equivalent to those typically employed to eiptain how 
people reason from premises that are accepted as "primary and true." 
Information lnte&ration Theory 
Anderson (196~.1981) has postulated a formal model to describe what are 
often referred to as 61111/Jnuc i.a/'ere11ce proct!ISS'IJS in social reasoning. Often 
cited as one of the most coherent and empirically well-grounded theories in 
social psychology, Anderson's model is typicalty in voted to describe how 
individuals make judgments based on consideration of a number of pieces of 
information. Although several algebraic inference process models have been 
postulated, Anderson's weighted average model has been the most influential. 
In the prototypical situation designed to test Anderson's model. an 
individual is presented with several different pieces of information and is asked 
to mate a judgment on the basis of this information. Anderson postulates that 
the individual first construes the meaning of each piece of information 
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separately for lhe inference to be made, lb.en may average these various 
judgments to arrive at his or her "final" inference. Bis model .not only attempts 
to account for lhe effects of lhe "new" information acquired i.n lhe judgmental 
situation, but additionally attempts to assess lhe possible effects of lhe judge's 
previous experience on his or her judgment in the task situation. I.n so doing, 
Anderson identifies as fundamental two components of the judgmental process: 
valuation and integration. Valuation refers to lhe process through which the 
possible effects of the judge's previous experience (in addition to lhe new 
information acquired in the judgmental situation) are accounted for. This is 
accomplished by assigning a weight and a scale value to the meaning of the 
judge's "initial impression," which is obtained before specific information is 
received about lhe targets. Integration refers to the manner in which these 
weights and scale values are combined to arrive at a subjective judgment of lhe 
object. In addition, Anderson suggests lb.at a third, response process may also be 
involved (that is, the process of transforming the subjective judgment of lhe 
object into the response language available for reporting this judgment). 
Relevant both for Anderson's project (and for our test of lhe predicational 
model in lb.is thesis) is lhe research on negativity biases in social evaluation 
(cf., Jones & Davis, 1965: Ianouse & Hanson. 1972; Parducci, 1968). Research in 
lb.is area has generally revealed lb.at people tend to weigh negative aspects of 
an object more heavily lb.an positive ones. Anderson himself found that 
negative adjectives seem more powerful lb.an positive adjectives in affecting 
individuals' overall evaluation of target persons (Anderson, 1965). Alt.hough 
several theories have been developed to account for lb.is phenomena, perhaps 
lhe most widely accepted is that which describes negativity biases as the result 
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of contraSt effects. As Jones & Davis ( 196') describe, given the normatively 
positive informational environment, negative traits and behavior are likely to 
lead to a greater attribution of personal characteristics to the individual, and 
tbus tbey provide "more" information than positive traits. By standing in 
contra.St to the norm, the individual invites attributions of responsibility for the 
particular trait; these attributions are in turn likely to increase the importance 
and centrality of the trait in evaluations of him or her as an individual 
(Ianouse & Hanson, 1972). 
In evaluating Anderson's model, most critics cite his post hoc parameter 
estimation procedures as a significant point of weakness in his theorizing (e.g., 
Wyer & Carlston, 1979). Anderson asserts that the relative importance of a piece 
of information may indeed be estimated during an initial valuation phase of the 
inference process, based on some a priori basis for considering it to be more or 
less relevant or important (e.g., its ambiguity, credibility of its source). 
However, in cases in which the obtaining of such information from subjects 
would contaminate subsequent judgments or other cases in which such 
information can't be obtained, estimates of weights must be obtained post hoc. 
In practice, the magnitude of the weight attached to each piece of information 
is usually inferred "es post facto" (that is, after the esperiment has been 
conducted) from the influence of this information upon judgments. Use of such 
post hoc parameter estimation procedures often requires certain (somewhat 
arbitrary) simplifying assumptions concerning the invariance of various 
model parameters over sets of information. 
This brings us to another point at which many consider the model to 
collapse. A close esamination of Anderson's model assumptions reveals that if 
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the weight and scale value of a piece of information were alloved to vary with 
its context. these parameters would need to be defined and measured separately 
for each set in which the piece is contained. In such an event, there would be 
no way to invalidate the model vithout independent estimates of these 
parameters (Wyer & Carlston. 1979). In practice, it is typically assumed that the 
scale value assigned to each piece of information is invariant over stimulus 
configurations--that is, the meaning of each piece of information is assumed 
not to depend on its context. The validity of this assumption is questionable at 
best. In addition. it betrays Anderson's reliance on a model which is 
fundamentally a mediational and an extraspective one. Various aspects of the 
information presented (e.g .. source credibility, ambiguity, negativity, 
consistency) mediate the assignment of weights to this information, and 
ultimately determine the judgment that will be formed. It is interesting to note 
that. in invoking aspects of the information such as source credibility, 
ambiguity and negativity as mediators in his model. Anderson is informally 
relying on constructs of an introspective nature. However, in practice such 
stimulus qualities or contexts are often "determined" extraspectively by the 
theorisV experimenter. 
Thus it seems that, although Anderson's averaging model may be 
somewhat successful in describing the functional relation between 
characteristics of different pieces of information and judgments based on this 
information. vhat the model ultimately says about the psychological processes 
underlying the judgments made is by no means clear. Lamiell (1987) has posed 
a challenging critique of the notion that such demonstrative, "algebraic" forms 
of reasoning underlie the formation of impressions. He has empirically 
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c1emonstrated that subjects in impression formation tasks do not simply revieY a 
target's score on a given personality dimension(s), situate the target on each 
dimension in comparison to the scores of others Yho have been rated along the 
same dimension, and finally arrive at a statistical estimate of what the target is 
Ute. Instead, he has shown that the target is placed Yithin an 
oppositionalty-f.ram.ed context which ultimately defines the dimension under 
consideration. Thus, Lamiell asserts that impressions are not formed by 
normatively relating scores of a target to the score of other persons in a 
comparison group, but are created through considering the target as he or she 
"is" (as regards the dimension of interest) in light of hoY he or she might be 
ptherwise. 
Finally, many of the inform.ation processing theorists tate issue with 
Anderson's mode! because it only describes mo tar processing stages, and fails to 
address finer processing questions lite "In Yhat order are integration 
operations performed Yhen impression formation judgments are calculated?" 
Anderson's model is aimed merely at describing the relation between stimulus 
input characteristics and reported judgment, Yhereas inform.ation processing 
theories attempt to address more directly the mediating processes that produce 
this relation and the conditions under Yhich these processes may occur. For 
e:u.mple, such theorists would most likely be interested in f.ram.ing theoretical 
principles that Yould predict Yhich processing rules might characterize 
integration in a variety of social judgment tasks. Several inform.ation 
processing models do attempt to answer such questions and develop such 
principles. HoYever, as Ye Yill see beloY, such attempts lead them to 
encounter a set of problems not wholly unlike that for which they ta.te 
Anderson to tas.t. 
IAformation Processing Theories 
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As mentioned above, the second major theoretical position represented in 
the research on social inference has as its foundation information processing 
models drawn from traditional cognitive psychology. Theorists within the 
in.formation processing tradition of social cognition have sought to elucidate 
the nature of the processes underlying the perception of social cues or "stimuli" 
and the formation of subsequent judgments. All of these models, among them 
Wyer & Carlston's (1979) nodal network. theory, Bower's U97') information 
processing theory, Abelson's (1976) script processing model, and 
Johnson-Laird's U983) theory of mental models, can be characterized as 
mediational ones, as they all see.t to describe cognitive processes as mediate or 
intervening steps between antecedent inputs and consequent responses. In 
addition, as we will show in the paragraphs that follow, such models fail to 
provide the theoretical framework. necessary to account for inference and 
implication as two distinct modes of reasoning. 
Li.te information integration theory, information processing approaches 
typically begin with a molar stage f ramewor.t, but most then move towards a 
more detailed specification of a variety of representational formats, .knowledge 
structures, memory systems, and elementary information processes. Iven 
though there exists a core of basic concepts Ce. g., sensory register, short-term 
memory, long-term memory) common to most information processing theories, 
there is considerable theory-to-theory variation among descriptions of the 
more "molecular" cognitive processes. In the paragraphs that follow, we will 
eJllDine several of the information processing theories that have been most 
influential in the area of social inference. 
No.dlJ. Netyork Theory 
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Wyer & Carlston ( 1979) have designed a nodal network theory of memory 
to account for social cognition in general, and impression formation in 
particular. As described above, their model characterizes memory as organized 
into a network of interconnecting nodes. 'Each concept in mind is represented 
by a node, and the nodes are connected by paths. 
A distinctive feature of mediation in Wyer & Carlston 's model which is 
highlighted by Rychlat & Bugaj Cl988) is that it is presumed to be intrinsically 
unidirectional. Instead of a predication of" jean" as "honest" being drawn from 
an oppositional context encompassing both honesty and dishonesty, nodal 
network theory describes the process as first requiring the encoding of "Jean", 
then the relational "is". then finally the descriptor "honest." Some process then 
combines these (unipolar) bits into a meaningful piece of information. The 
paths connecting nodes are construed as unidirectional: in other words, if two 
concepts are associated one with another, m. paths would have to be 
formed--for example. one uniting "honest" to "trustworthy" and one going in 
the opposite direction. The direction of the path connecting the nodes reflects 
the order in which the concepts occurred in past presentations of the relation 
Cibid). (The tie of one nodal concept to another can also be due to the semantic 
association of meanings assigned to words by culture.> 
As this model has no way of capturing a dialectical oppositionality, the 
same dual associative paths would apply if we had opposite associations under 
consideration; except in this case, it is assumed that there is a greater distance 
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..,ween the nodes than would be true of two words with synonymic meaning 
re.tations. Such concepts would be "remotely associated in the judge's implicit 
personality theory, a.nd are unlikely to be connected to the same schema node in 
Uie superstructure" (Wyer & Carlston, 1979, p. 99). Thus it is not the inherent 
oppositional relation between descriptors such as /Jo.aest-dis/Jo.aest that sets the 
broad contelt from which a.n inference or implication must be drawn, but the 
past unipolar associations (produced by frequent contiguous presentations of 
stimuli) in the individual's history <Bugaj & Rychlak. 1988). ConsequenUy, it 
should be apparent that speaking of inference versus some other t.ind of 
process U.e .. implication) would make no sense within nodal network theory. 
lmplicational Molecule Theory 
Abelson & Reich ( 1969) have postulated a.n implicational molecule theory 
to account for the process of drawing social inferences. Although Abelson 
intended his later script processing theory to be a more comprehensive account 
of social inference processes, the earlier implicational molecule model clearly 
illustrates some of the mediational assumptions on which his account of script 
processing is based. lmplicational molecule theory asserts the existence of sets 
of generalizations about persons, objects, a.nd events that are bound together by 
psychological "implication" (a term which Abelson and Reich fail to define). In 
combination, the generalizations in each set form a .,,/ttcultt or general 
concept. To use one of Abelson and Reich's el&lllples, the idea that people do 
things to accomplish desired goals may be formalized in the three-sentence 
"purposive behavior" molecule IA wants Y; I causes Y; A does Il. where A is a 
class of persons. I is a class of acts or behaviors, and Y is a class of outcomes or 
events. Each molecule ca.n be used to interpret information about specific 
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persons and events and make inferences about them. 
Abelson and Reich hypothesize that molecules mediate interpretation 
according to a complell'oD priaciplfl. This principle states that if the 
information a judge receives about specific persons and events is consistent 
with all but one generalization in a given molecule. the judge will tend to infer 
a relation between these specific instances that is consistent with the 
remaining general.ization. For example. when the information available about 
specific instances is relevant to only one generalization in a three-sentence 
molecule. a judge may often mate inferences consistent with the other two. For 
example, a judge, given information that" Jim wants to win the lottery" and "Jim 
knows that the last hundred lottery winners bought their tickets on a Friday 
morning," might apply the purposive behavior molecule and infer that" Jim 
buys his lottery tickets on Friday mornings." Note that. according to the model. 
any one of the sentences in the molecule could be inferred given the other wo. 
Most theorists of an information processing bent view Abelson's 
postulation of the completion principle to be the most significant contribution 
of implicational molecule theory. This principle is viewed as unique because it 
postulates that reasoning does not have to occur in a stricUy ordered pattern 
from a major premise of a molecule, to the minor premise, to the conclusion. 
Abelson and Reich (1969) assert that many times people infer for imply?) the 
third given any two, without regard for the constrictions of formal logic. 
However. the process by which the completion of a molecule occurs is the 
Rml, despite the fact that the person may be reasoning from a premise to a 
conclusion. from a premise to a premise, or from a conclusion to a premise. 1/e 
can. therefore, see that even though the authors speak of both i.al't11Y1Dt:11 and 
iJBph&alioa in describing reasoning processes. the model describes only one 
an of logic grounding reasoning--ademonstrative. inferential sort. There is 
no room in their model for the completion of a molecule based on a dialectical 
reasoning to the opposite of a molecule premise or conclusion. 
Abelson's model is also criticized for lac.ting guidelines for predicting a 
priori which molecules may exist in a judge's cognitive system and which are 
apt to be brought to bear on judgments in a given situation. The model 
ultimately invokes mediating stimulus properties (such as salience, etc.> to 
account for the use of a particular molecule and the type of inference made. As 
we wiU see below, Abelson's U976; see also Schant & Abelson, 1977) model of 
script processing fails to transcend this reliance on strictly mediationaJ. 
assumptions. 
kr.iJJ1 Processin& Theory 
Abelson Cl976: Schant &Abelson.1977) defines a script as a coherent 
sequence of events e:s:pected by an individual. involving him or her either as 
participant or observer. Scripts are presumably acquired throughout a person's 
lifetime, either through directe1perience or through various communication 
media. Thus. Abelson Cl976) asserts that scripts, lite implicationaJ. molecules. 
may often be idiosyncratic to an individual. resulting from his unique past 
learning history. On the other hand, he argues that many situations and 
experiences are sufficiently common to our culture that the essential features 
of some scripts are apt to be widely shared. A script is theoretically composed of 
a series of vignettes, each of which consists of both an image and a conceptual 
representation of the event and the elements involved. Although Abelson 
litens the vignette to " a picture plus caption," the modality of both the image 
a.od its representation is unrestricted. In combination, the vignettes 
comprising a script tell a story. 
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The limitations of script processing theory discussed in the literature are 
similar in many respects to those leveled at the implicational molecule theory. 
For eumple. the theory offers no clear predictions on what will eventuate 
when the configuration of information presented fails to adequately match an 
exisUng vigneue. This in turn suggest a more basic probtem concerning how 
scripts are learned to begin with. Although we suspect that Abelson would 
describe such learning in terms of a frequency and contiguity form of 
association. his model only addresses reasoning that occurs l!w: scripts are in 
place. In addition, the model leaves unaddressed the guidelines for predicting 
in advance the scripts that are likely to be accessed and used in any given 
instance. especially under conditions where more than one is potentially 
applicable. (Usually, some "higher order," propositional reasoning process is 
invoked post hoc to account for such accessing strategies.) 
That this sort of criticism can be leveled at most information processing 
theories is telling. Essentially, such theorists appear confused about the 
direction of cognitive ''causality" in their theories of mind. Many information 
processing theories characterize the human organism as actively constructing 
stimulus fields or at least "going beyond the information given .. in making 
attributions, etc. However, preoccupied as they are with modeling computer 
analogs. such theorists unnecessarily restrict their description of reasoning in 
accordance with the mechanism of the computer "hardware" (Rychlat, 1988). 
Thus. they lack the conceptual tools to frame reasoning as a predicational 
process. The result of this limitation is what we have revealed thus far--that a 
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JD,ediational process (such as a script) is invoked to account for what stimuli get 
encoded at the same time that equivalent mediational processes are described as 
"called up" or initiated by certain (unmediated?) stimuli present in the 
environment. 
Theory J2{ Mental Models 
Echoing the aforementioned theorists' concern with demonstratively 
certain, "correct" forms of drawing inferences, Johnson-Laird 0983) takes the 
question of "How is it possible for people to reason validly, that is, to draw a 
conclusion that must be true given that the premises are true?" as a 
fundamental riddle to be solved by any theory purporting to explain social 
judgment. However, in contrast to the theories describing strictly 
demonstrative, formal syllogistic forms of reasoning, he defends the thesis that 
reasoning ordinarily proceeds without recourse to a mental logic from which 
formal rules of inference may be derived. Like Abelson in script processing 
theory, Johnson-Laird rejects a theory of the person as a strictly propositional 
reasoner employing rules of logic for a theory of how people reason on the 
basis of schematic representations of objects, event, and actors. Thus, although 
he maintains the interest in demonstrative forms of reasoning addressed by the 
theorists discussed above, he rejects the assumption on which most of the other 
models rest--that is, that such reasoning is grounded in rules of formal logic. 
Mackie ( 1974) also eschews postulating a system of formal rules and the 
machinery for manipulating them for a characterization of people as reasoning 
by constructing a representation of the events described by the premises. 
Mackie also notes that the propositions that characterize our reasoning about 
causal events tend to be "elliptical" or "gappy". For both Mackie and 
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. Johnson-Laird. reasoning is not a matter of recovering logical forms of the 
premises and then applying rules of inference to get a conclusion. Instead. the 
heart of the process is interpreting premises as mental models and searching 
for counterexamples to conclusions by trying to construct alternative models of. 
the premises. Mac.tie ( 1974) asserts that the notion of cause is defined with 
reference to contrary-to-fact conditionals. He states: "The key item is a picture 
of what would have happened if things had been otherwise ... It is a contrast 
case rather than the repetition of like instances that contributes most to our 
primitive concept of causation" (p. '7). 
It should be apparent that both of these theorists are describing 
something akin to the role of oppositional reasoning in defining the context 
from which a predication can ultimately be drawn. In line with both logical 
learning theory and the logic of att.ribution described by Mackie (ibid), we have 
demonstrated empirically CRychlak et al, 1988) that people rely on 
oppositionality to solve problems, and that they can be seen improving their 
sensitivity to opposition over a series of learning trials--resulting in a 
"learning curve" for oppositionality. In addition. Rychlak (1987) found that 
subjects know when they are inferring from reasonably solid grounds and 
when they are forming implications based on somewhat tenuous grounds. In 
the same study. subjects recalled personality descriptors significanUy better 
when they were based on inferences than Yhen they Yere based upon 
implications. 
Judement Heuristics 
In Tversky & Kahneman's (1974) theory of judgmental heuristics, we 
encounter an image of the reasoner which is more akin to that hinted at by 
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Mackie (1974) and Johnson-Laird (1933) than that prof erred by the information 
processing theorists. Tversky & Kahneman propose a number of judgmental 
strategies or /Jeuristics on which people seem to rely in a variety of inferential 
taSks. These heuristics are often rather primitive and simple. and their use does 
A.Ill imply a conscious and deliberate application of computational-type 
algorithms for deducing "correct" inferences. These strategies are often 
employed intuitively or automatically, and are also often applied in tasks or 
settings in which they are "inappropriate" (or incapable of producing a 
"correct" inference. see belo11». 
Tversty and Kahneman ouUine four judgment heuristics--availabilit.y, 
representativeness, anchoring, and adjustment--only one of which we will 
describe here. Tversky and Kahneman assert that when people are required to 
judge the relative frequency of particular objects or the likelihood of particular 
events. they often may be influenced by the relative af7lila/Jil1~y or 
accessibility of the objects or events in the processes of perception, memory, or 
construction from imagination. For example, it has become apparent to many 
eiperimenters that certain. aspects of statistical logic are not appreciated by 
subjects in social judgment tas.ts. A hypothetical scenario Hlust.rating this 
phenomenon might proceed thus: A pollster who as.ts a sample of adults to 
estimate "the percentage of the wort force •ho are currenUy unemployed" 
finds an "egocentric bias." That is, currenUy unemployed workers tend to 
overestimate the unemployment rate while currenUy employed Yorkers tend to 
underestimate it (after Nisbett &Ross. 1980). In fact, Kahneman and Tversty 
( 1972) did find that subject's category membership (i.e .. predicating) judgments 
•ere relatively insensitive to baserate information •hen any case-specific 
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· iJlformaUon vas also presented. and they invoked the availability heuristic to 
account for such errors. Thus. their explanation vould assert that unemployed 
people are more likely to know and meet other unemployed people than are 
employed people, and vice versa. 
However, Tversky and Kahneman also emphasize that individuals are not 
&am.pelted to rely on biased availability criteria in such situations. For example, 
given the situation oullio.ed above, individuals could try to rem.ember vhat 
information on unemployment they have read or heard in the media and 
therefore apply some popular rule of thumb, or they could even try to 
~m.pensate for the biases distorting their samples of available data ("Hardly 
anyone I k.nov is jobless, but of course, I don't get to meet many unemployed 
people, do I? I guess I'd better adjust my estimate upvardl'') 
Such a characterization suggests that the individual is not constrained in a 
particular set of circumstances to reason from a particular heuristic. Thus, it 
seems that Tversty and Kabneman's theory is compatible vith the a theory of 
reasoning which is grounded in oppositional framing of contem along 
dimensions of what is the case to vhat is not, or what might be implied. In this 
sense it comes close to the perspecUve ve are arguing for. and to that put forth 
by Lam.iell <1987). Unfortunately, despite a partial characterization of the 
social reasoner as capable of transcending unipolar input through reasoning 
against intuitive biases such as availability, etc., they ulUmately rely on 
mediation.al processes to explain vhy a given heuristic is used (or not) in a 
given situation. Since they have no formal theory of the reasoner as 
predicating agent, they tend to fall back. on environmental cues as "acUvators" 
of given heuristics. 
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one of the more interesting aspects of Tversky & Kahneman 's research has 
relevance for our own interest in studying the role of negation in broadening 
presentational contexts along oppositional lines and its relationship to the 
drawing of implications. Tversky and Kahneman found that how information is 
presented to the subject influences his or her framing of its import. For 
example. a person's attitude toward some event is different if we tell him or her 
that in a certain battle four hundred people out of si1 hundred were killed, as 
opposed to conveying the same information as "two hundred of the sil hundred 
people were spared death." In like fashion, we would predict that statements 
such as "Andrew never pays his bills on time" and "Andrew is always late in 
paying his bills" might also differentially influence people's framing of the 
meaning being conveyed, even though stricUy speaking they are semantically 
equivalent. Such phrasings are irrelevant to a statistician, or to a machine that 
is processing numbers, but people are apparenUy differentially influenced 
here. 
The effects of the framing of information found by Tvers.ty and 
Kahneman, combined with the relationship between negation and oppositional 
reasoning postulated by logical learning theory lead us to make two general 
predictions concerning the effect of negational phrasing on the direction of 
impression formation. First, we would predict that when information 
concerning the behavior of another person is presented in a 
negationally-phrased statement, that explanations opposite to the descriptive 
premise being negated in the statement would be chosen significanUy more 
often than non-oppositional explanations. Second, we would also predict that 
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information concerning a person about whom one has already formed an 
impression would facilitate a greater change of opinion in a direction opposite 
the initial impression when such information is framed in a negational fashion. 
In the following chapter we will outline a method to study such factors. 
focusing on negational versus non-negational phrasing and drawing from a 
predicational model. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
In order to test our predictions concerning the relationship between 
negation and the drawing of oppositional implications, we designed two separate 
eiperiments. The first e1peciment was designed to ascertain whether subjects 
would. indeed. tend to draw implications to the opposite of a statement when the 
statement was framed as a negation. In the second e1periment, we were 
interested in discovering whether information framed in a negation.al manner 
would facilitate the change of a previous judgment in a direction opposite this 
initial judgment. The method employed in implementing .b.Q.Lll. of these 
e1periments is described in Chapter Ill, with the method used in Uperiment I 
described first and that used in Uperiment II described second. The results of 
both these e1periments are presented in Chapter IV. 
Experiment I: Implications Scale 
Hypotheses: 
1. Subjects yho are asked to choose betlleen m possible explanations for the 
behavior of IA individual yill, yhen the behavioral description is presented in 
the form of a neaation. select the one of the two alternatives which is most 
opposite in meaoin& to the premise beina neaated in the statement. 
RATIONALE: Based on the findings of Tvers.ty & Kahneman (1974, refer 
above) concerning the way in which information is presented, we --in this 
instance-- inferred thatit would be possible to predict a subject's drawing of 
implications to the opposite of a statement when that statement encompasses a 
negation. Thus, if a subject is told that a person has "never done" something or 
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daltlA event yas "not done" in som.e Yay, then Ye Youtd expect the subject to 
be JDOte 1ite1y to reason im.plicationa11y from. •hat Yas being negated to its 
opposite than to accept a less oppositional characterization of the 
circumstances. 
z. IJJ.e expected effect ouUined in Hypothesis 1 yill be stronaer for the 
difed iJDplications than it yill be for the indirect implications. 
RATIONALE: When confronted Yith a negationa1 statement which sets the 
coAtelt for a direct implication, the subject reasons from. the meaning of one 
word to its opposite (antonym.) and does not have to f ram.e intermediate steps, as 
is the case with the indirect items. It follows that it should be easier to draw an 
implication wheA direct items are being used than when indirect items are 
being used. 
Subjects: 
Subjects were m.a!e and fem.ate college students who participated in the 
experiment in partia! fulfillment of a course requirement in their introductory 
psychology class. One-hundred thirty-seven undergraduate students were 
randomly assigned to one of the three e:iperimental groups: Group A: N • <f3 
subjects (23 fem.ates, 20 m.a!es); Group B: N • '2 subjects (26 fem.ates, 26 mates); 
and Group C: N • <f2 subjects ( 21 fem.ates, 21 m.a!es). 
Procedure: 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, it was necessary to com.pare statements 
en com.passing oppositiona!ity with non-oppositional statements. To mate for 
the strongest test of the hypothesis. we decided to confront the oppositional 
e:iptanation with two different non-oppositional explanations, one on each of 
t"tlo separate test forms (see below). Then, on a third form., the two 
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non-oppositional explanations could be compared with each other. If subjects 
could be shown to consistently choose an oppositional explanation for why an 
individual under description behaves in a particular way, rather than either of 
two equally plausible non-oppostional explanations, then Hypothesis 1 would 
appear to have been supported. (In addition, we could compare any 
non-oppositional alternatives chosen significantly more often on the third 
form with the oppositional alternative.) 
Jnstruments: 
We constructed three forms of an Implications Scale. Each form of the scale 
contained thirty items, fifteen of which were direct implications and fifteen of 
which were indirect implications (see Appendix A for the actual items used). 
Form A contained items of the following sort ( iDdirect and direct implications, 
respectively): 
1) John never takes his shirt off in public. 
___A. John is ashamed of his physique. 
_ _.....B, John cat.ch es cold easily. 
2) Karen's face reflected an emotional mood, but it was not happiness. 
___A, Karen was angry. 
_ _.....B. Karen was sad. 
Items on Form B contained the same initial statement, but the oppositional 
alternative (e.g., "John is ashamed of his physique" or"Karen was sad," 
respectively) was paired with a second non-oppostional alternative, as follows: 
1) John never takes his shirt off in public. 
___A. John sunburns easily. 
_ _.....B. John ls ashamed or his physique. 
2) Karen's face reflected an emotional mood, but it was not happiness. 
__A. Karen was sad. 
__ B. Karen was bored. 
The order in which the oppositional alternative was presented (i.e., first or 
second) was counterbalanced within each form. The third form, Form C, 
contained the same initial statement followed by the two non-oppositional 
alternatives from Forms A and B, as fo11ows: 
1) john never takes his shirt off in public. 
__A. john catches cold easily. 
----B. john sunburns easily. 
2) Karen's face reflected an emotional mood, but it was not happiness. 
--A. Karen was bored. 
_ __...B. Karen was angry. 
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The 30 items ultimately used in the Implications Scale were originally 
drawn from a larger pool of about 60 items. For each of the items ultimately 
included in the scale, the "oppositional" alternative had to be reliably rated as 
clearly oppositional by three independent judges. In other words, all three 
judges had to agree that the "oppositional" alternative was indeed the one 
opposite in meaning to the premise being negated in the lead-in statement. In 
this way, about 30 items were eliminated from the pool, leaving the 30 
reliably-rated items which were combined to create the scale. 
Application of the Instruments: 
Subjects were run in small groups of two to ten students. They were 
initially given a statement of informed consent to read and sign prior to 
beginning the experimental procedure. This statement emphasized that their 
participation •as voluntary. that they could withdra• from the experiment at 
any time without incurring a penalty. and that their performance would be 
tept confidential. Following completion of this form, subjects were handed (in 
random order) either Form A, Form B, or Form C and were instructed to read 
through the form and follow the directions carefully. Subjects were 
encouraged to ask questions if they did not understand the instructions. After 
all subject.shad completed the forms, they were given a written debriefing 
concerning the purpose of the experiment (see Appendll A for a copy of the 
actual form used). When the subjects had finished reading the debriefing, the 
e1perimenter took time to respond to any questions the debriefing may have 
left. unanS'tlered. Following this, the e:1perimenter sisned each subject's 
verification of participation form, and the subjects were dis.missed. 
Elperiment 11: Movin1 an Impression Oppositionally Folloyina Information that 
is Presented as a Ne1ation 
IJ:periment I is designed to establish that subjects will select an oppositional 
alternative when the information they are presented with is framed 
negationally. However, we are also interested in discoverins whether such 
negationally-framed information would facilitate the chance of a previously 
affirmed position in a direction opposite the initial position. In line with our 
discussion of the Aristotelian contelt as generated throush dialectical 
oppositionality. we theorized that presenting information contradictory to a 
previously affirmed opinion would indeed result in a sreater change in attitude 
in the direction of the opposite pole of opinion than when identical 
contradictory information is presented in a non-oppositional form. This brings 
us to IJ:periment II of the present thesis. 
u.veothesiJ.: 
S,ubjects asked to make a judament concernin& the relative Presence or 
absence of a personality or character trait in a target person. and who are 
&iYen subsequent information which contradicts their ori&ina1 judament. will 
12§ seen to chan&e their opinion more readily when the contradictory 
wformation is framed as a neaation than when it lacks this neaational quality. 
RATIONALE: As outlined in the rationale for Experiment I, we believe that 
subjects presented with premises framed as negations will be more litely to 
elhibit a greater magnitude of opinion change in the direction opposite their 
initial impression change than subjects who are presented with the same 
information in non-negational form. Given that the relationship outlined 
above between negation, implication and oppositionality holds when subjects 
have formed no previous judgment about a target person, it would be of interest 
to ascertain whether such a relation would hold when subjects were presented 
with information designed to change an already existing impression. We were 
also interested in discovering whether this relationship would hold similarly 
for information concerning both personality and character traits of a target 
person. 
Subjects: 
Forms I and II were administered to separate groups of s:i; and 94 subjects, 
respectively. Of the s:i; subjects administered Form I, 43 were female and 42 were 
male; of the 94 subjects administered Form II. 4:i; were female and 49 were male. 
The subjects were college students participating in the experiment in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement in introductory psychology. 
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In order to test our hypothesis, it vas necessary to present subjects with 
iJlf ormation which would allow them to form an initial impression of a target 
person. then to present them vith secondary information--vhich was framed 
iD. either a negational or non-negational fashion-- designed to change this 
impression. We wanted the formation of their initial impression to be relatively 
"unconstrained;" that is, ve didn't vant to "weight" the information in a 
particular direction or to present it in a way that might have some systematic 
influence on the subjects' initial ratings. We were also interested in examining 
the relationship between the subjects' ratings along both personality IA.d. 
character dimensions of target behavior. and the extent to which the subjects 
would find the target individual likable or disli.table. 
Instruments: 
Subjects were intially presented with a form containing eight "facts" 
concerning the behavior of the target person. We employed two general 
versions of this form, one version characterizing the target in terms of 
introverted and enra.verted behaviors C&tm.l> and one characterizing the 
targetin terms of selfish and unselfish behaviors CfQrm.11). Within each of 
these two conditions. ve employed both a male (Greg, Robert) and a. female 
(Cheryl, Janet) version of the fa.ctual description. Table 1 presents the 
introverted-enraverted version, fQrm.J; fm:m.11 can be found in Appendix B. 
The target persons were initially described on the basis of eight cha.racteristic 
behavior patterns that vere noted during their high school years. On fQrm. L 
four of the descriptive statements suggested introversion and four suggested 
extraversion; on Wm.IL four of the statements suggested selfishness and four 
JJblel · F U d . E . II J1&Voyersion-E1t.ra.vers1on. ~rmse 1n1penment 
WHAT SORT OF PERSON IS CHERYL/GREG? 
Let's imagine that you have just finished high school. One of the young 
yo.men in your class is named Cheryl, and you have heard different opinions 
concerning the sort of person she is. Some people think that she is an 
extraverted person, but just as many others feel that she is introverted. You 
bave seen her around the school off and on for several years, and even before 
that you knew her casually when you were both growing up. 
As you think about this question of whether Cheryl is introverted or 
enraverted. you can recall certain facts about her. as follows: 
She always seemed to be campaigning for a position in the student 
government or other organization. Although she was always very quiet during 
class. she never failed to talk to others at the lunch table. But, she never wanted 
to go out on weekends, preferring instead to stay at home and read. She never 
seemed to have any difficulty making friends. She never attended any of the 
football or basketball games. But, she enjoyed acting and always had a part in 
the yearly school play. 
Based on these facts, please mark below whether you would agree with 
those who saw Cheryl as introverted, or with those who saw her as e:rtraverted. 
Place an "X" at the point on the line below that represents !2YJ: llJ1 jud1ment 
WA. .tta am DY. Un.: 
e:rtraverted introverted 
Mle 1 (continued) 
atroversion-EJtra.yersion form Used in Experiment II 
CHERYL/GREG AF1'ER A PASSAGE OF TIME 
Now let's imagine that several years have passed, years in which you have 
had the chance to learn further facts about Cheryl first hand. Here is what you 
now know about her first hand: 
EJtraversion/Ne1ation: 
She never failed to eat lunch with her coworkers. 
She did not hide her emotions. 
She never hesitated to ask other people for advice. 
She never failed to attend an office party thrown by one of her colleagues. 
She never failed to maintain a large circle of friends. 
Ext.ra.version/Non-neaation; 
She always ate lunch vith her coworkers. 
She openly e.1pressed her emotions. 
She was often asking other people for advice. 
She always attended the office parties thrown by her colleagues. 
She always had a large circle of friends. 
Introversion/Ne1ation: 
She never ate lunch with her coworkers. 
She did not openly e.1press her emotions. 
She never asked other people for advice. 
She did not attend any of the office parties thrown by her colleagues. 
She never had a large circle off riends. 
lntroversion/Non-ne1ation: 
She avoided eating lunch with her coworkers. 
She hid her emotions. 
She refrained from asking other people for advice. 
She avoided attending any of the office parties thrown by her colleagues. 
She only had a f ev friends. 
Based on all the facts you have gathered over the years, what voutd you 
now say about Cheryl's relative introversion or enraversion? You may feel that 
you don't have enough information or would lite to know more. However, 
please make your best judgment utilizing all the information given. Place an 
"I" at the point on the line below that represents your best judgment about 
Cheryl: 
e.ltraverted introverted 
fi.ble 1 (continued) 
!Atroversion-Extra.yersion Form Used in Experiment II 
Based on what you know about Cheryl's behavior, please let us know whether 
you would find such a person likable or dislikable. Place a.n "X" at the point on 
the line below that represents your best judgment about Cheryl in terms of 
likableness or dislikableness: 
likable dislikable 
Please list a.ny thoughts you have about Cheryl that explain why you gave 
her the three ratings you did. 
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suggested unselfishness. Thus, on fJwll.1 subjects were initially presented with 
equivalent amounts of information describing the target in terms of 
introversion and e:nraverslon; on fJwll.11 subjects were initially presented 
with equivalent. amounts of information describing the ta.rget. in terms of 
selfishness and unselfishness. 
To qualify for inclusion on the form, the descriptive statements had to be 
reliably rated as strongly reflecting prototypical behaviors of a introverted, 
enraverted, selfish, or unselfish, individual. We presented two independent 
judges with four lists of eight statements each. Each list contained statements 
thought to reflect the personality (i.e., enraversion - introversion) or 
character (i.e .. unselfishness - selfishness) trait in question, and were 
descriptive of actions which might logically characterize the behavior of a 
"typical" high school-aged individual. Thus, Lill I statements described 
behaviors thought to reflect enraversion, Lillll statements were thought to 
reflect introversion, IJalll statements were thought to reflect unselfish 
behaviors, and Lill II statements were thought to reflect selfish behaviors. 
Ba1f (four) of the statements o.o. each of the lists were framed in negational 
form and half were framed non-negatio.o.ally. Eumples from Lillll (selfish) 
include "Be was never willing to stop on his way to school and pict up friends 
who needed a ride"(.o.egational) and "T/he.o. thin.gs didn't go his was at basketball 
practice, he would just up and leave"(.o.on-negational). 
The judges were requested to rate the statements on a reliability scale of 
zero to three based o.o. the degree to which they reflected the personality or 
character dimension they were designed to convey. A rating of zero suggested 
that the behavioral description did not reflect the trait at all, a rating of one 
suiiested that the relationship between the behavior and the trait was only 
slight. a rating of two suggested that the relationship between the trait and the 
beha.vior was fairly strong, and a rating of three suggested that the behavioral 
description strongly reflected the trait in question. Four statements (two 
negation.at and two non-negation.al) were chosen from each of the lists, based 
on the criteria that each had been given a rating of three by both of the judges. 
E1a.mples of statements rated by both judges as strongly reflecting the trait in 
question include "He never refused to help his friends with their homework" 
(reflecting unselfishness) and "She was always quiet in class" (reflecting 
introversion). 
To create the forms used in the actual experiment, the four statements 
from I.ml and the four statements from I.mil were put together in the form of 
a descriptive paragraph, with the order of presentation of the statements 
roughly counterbalanced. For example. the introductory paragraph on f.fwlll 
contained eight statements presented in the following order: l) extra.version/ 
non-negationat 2) introversion/non-negationat 3) enraversion/negationat 
4) introverted/negationa1 ') introverted/non-negationat 6) extraverted/ 
negation.at 7) introversion/negationat 8) extraversion/non-negationat. The 
four statements selected from LmtlllCunsetfish) and lY (selfish) were 
combined to form a descriptive paragraph in an equivalent manner. 
The instructions which foUowed the paragraph of descriptive statements 
requested that the subjects mate a judgment about the target along the given 
dimension based on the eight facts given. A Z'-point rating scale was then 
presented, with the anchor points labeled "enraverted" Cleft anchor point) and 
"iat.r0verted" (right anchor point) on &.aa.L and "unselfish" (left anchor 
Point) and "selfish" (right anchor 
point) on fuJD.Il. 
The second half of fUm land Il contai.D.ed additional information, this 
time concerning the target's behavior after high school. This information was 
presented in the form of five statements, all of which described the target in 
terms of either one pole or the other of the personality or character 
dimensions. For example, subjects who had been presented with initial 
information describing the target in. terms of enraversion.-introversion. were 
subsequently presented with addition.at information. which described the target 
in terms of either all enraverted or all introverted behaviors. lie will refer to 
this dimension. of the addition.al information., that is, whether it described 
introverted or extraverted behaviors (on Ur.ml; selfish or unselfish behaviors 
on UDll Il> as the content of the addition.at information. So, the content of the 
secondary information the subjects received was dependent on. how the subject 
had initially rated the target. If a subject completing &r.m l had initially rated 
the target as enraverted. he or she received addition.at information. describing 
the target's later behavior in who11y introverted terms. Conversely, it the 
subject's initial rating had been. placed on the introverted side of the dimension., 
he or she received addition.al information which described only enraverted 
behaviors. 
However, the additional information that subjects received was also 
phrased in one of two ways--either in a negation.al or non-negation.at fashion. 
lie will refer to this dimension of the additional information Ci. e., whether it 
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was phrased in a negational or non-negational fashion) as the Cru:m. of the 
additional information. So, for example, a subject who had initially rated the 
target as extraverted could receive additional information describing the target 
as introverted which was phrased either negationally or non-negationally. The 
negational form of such a statement might read "She did not openly eipress her 
emotions." The non-negational counterpart would then read "She hid her 
emotions." 
As noted above. the content of the additional information the subjects Yere 
to receive Yas determined by their initial rating. (This initial rating •as 
determined solely by the subject, and •as not influenced by the eiperimenter 
in any Tay.) The form in which the additional information was presented. 
either negational or non-negational. •as determined in a random fashion. This 
was accomplished by ordering the sheets comprising the second half of &r.ml l 
and ll (i.e .. containing the additional information) randomly before 
distributing them to subjects. Thus, there •ere eight sets of randomly ordered 
sheets, four for &will (introverted/negational, introverted/non-negational, 
enraverted/negational, and enraverted/ non-negational) and four for &u:mll 
(selfish/negational. selfish/non-negational. unselfish/negational, and 
unselfish/non-negational). For e1&1Dple, if a subject given fJu:m.ll had placed 
her initial rating on the selfish side of the dimension, she •ould be given 
additional information describing the target in terms of unselfish behaviors. 
The form of the additional information she received •ould be determined 
randomly. 
These additional descriptive statements •ere derived by means of the same 
procedure used to derive the statements comprising the initial descriptive 
paragraph (refer above). That is, two judges were presented with lists of 
fourteen statements each and asked to rate each on a reliability scale with 
values ranging from zero to three. Lml statements described behaviors 
thought to reflect introversion. Lmll statements described behaviors thought 
to reflectextraversion. Lin Ill statements described behaviors thought to 
reflect unselfishness. and Lm.IY statements described behaviors thought to 
reflect selfishness. AU the statements were designed to reflect actions which 
might logically characterize the behaviors of a high school or college graduate 
who had entered the working world. 
The instructions following the five descriptive statements asked the 
subjects to mate a second rating based on all the information presented. 
Subjects were then presented with a second rating scale, which was identical to 
the one on which they had made their first rating. Following this were 
instructions asking the subject to rate the target in terms of likableness and 
dislitableness, and a second Zl-point rating scale with the left anchor point 
labeled as "dislitabJe" and the right anchor point labeled "litable" was provided 
for this purpose. Finally, subjects were asked to list any thoughts they had 
concerning why they gave the target the three ratings they did. 
Application of the Instruments: 
Subjects were run in small groups of from two to twelve students. Subjects 
were given an informed consent statement to read and sign prior to beginning 
the experimental procedure. This statement emphasized that their participation 
was voluntary, that they could withdraw from the experiment at any time 
without incurring a penalty, and that the data would be kept confidential. 
Following completion of this form. subjects were handed either l!u:a.Lor &m 
nand were instructed to read through the fo.rm and follow the directions 
carefully. Subjects we.re encouraged to ask questions if they did not understand 
tbe inst.ructions. 
Afte.r all subjects had completed the fi.rst .rating, they we.re handed the 
second half of either [Qrm l o.r lfil:m.ll. As described ea.rlie.r, the pa.rticula.r 
version of the additional information they .received was dependent on both the 
direction of thei.r initial .rating and the .random o.rde.ring of the negationally 
and non-negationally phrased information within each of the groups. To 
determine the content of the secondary information each subject should .receive 
(i.e., either int.rove.rted o.r ext.rave.rted, o.r selfish o.r unselfish), the 
e1pe.rimente.r placed a template ove.r each subject's .rating scale which divided 
the scale in half and allowed fo.r determination of the direction of the subject's 
.rating. As described above, when subjects made a .rating which fell above o.r 
below the midpoint of the .rating scale, they were given secondary information 
opposite to this .rating. If the subjects made a .rating coincident with the exact 
midpoint of the scale, the content and fo.rm of the additional information they 
.received was determined .randomly. When subjects had completed the second 
pa.rt of the procedure, the expe.rimente.r collected the fo.rms and handed out a 
debriefing statement which ouUined the purpose of the study. Afte.r the 
e1pe.rimente.r answered any questions the subjects might have had about the 
purpose of the e1pe.riment, they we.re dismissed. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
EJperiment I: Implications Scale 
Jn order to test Hypothesis l, it was .necessary to examine each item and to 
compare the selection rate for the oppositional alter.native with the selection 
rate for the two .non-oppositional alter.natives. Thus, for example, we would 
want to .t.now how many subjects in the sample chose the alter.native "john is 
ashamed of his physique" rather than the alter.native "john catches colds 
easily" or the alter.native "john sunburns easily." These comparisons can be 
made on Forms A and B. '1 e were also interested in eu.mi.ning any significant 
differences in the selection rate when the the two .non-oppositional 
alter.natives were paired with each other, as on Form C. In this way, Form C 
served as a control; that is, if one of the two .non-oppositional alter.natives on 
Form C was chosen sig.nificanUy more often, this alter.native coud be compared 
with the performance of the oppositional alter.native tested on Forms A and B. If 
Hypothesis l obtains. then we should find a sig.nificanUy greater number of 
subjects selecting the alter.native "john is ashamed of his physique" than either 
the alter.native "john catches colds easily" or the alter.native "john sunburns 
easily." 
To test for the significance of such selections, a Chi-square analysis was 
performed on u&b. ilia of Forms A, B, and C of the Implications Scale. Thus, on 
Form A, subjects were categorized as either choosing the oppositional or 
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non-oppositional alternative for a given item, and the total number of subjects 
in each category was tabulated. The difference between the oppositional and 
non-oppositional categories was then tested against a '01'0 selection ratio. The 
same procedure was carried out for each of the items on Forms Band C. It was 
particularly important to contrast the alternatives which were chosen 
significantly more often on Form C (all of them non-oppositional) with the 
oppositional alternatives presented on Forms A and B. That is, if a 
non-oppositional alternative proved to be chosen significantly more often than 
its other non-oppositional counterpart on Form C, it would suggest the presence 
of a cultural preference or selection bias between the two non-oppositional 
alternatives. The most telling test of Hypothesis 1 would then be to see if this 
cultural preference for one of the non-oppositional alternatives would 
"override" the logic of oppositional selection which we were investigating on 
Forms A and B. This question was addressed by comparing any Form C 
non-oppositional alternatives selected significantly more often with the 
alternative chosen significantly more often on Forms A and B. Thus, we could 
assess whether there arose any non-oppositional alternatives which were 
chosen significantly more often on both Form C and either Form A or B. If no 
such significant non-oppositional alternative arose on an item, and the 
oppositional alternative proved significant on one or both Forms A and B, then 
oppositionality would appear to be a powerful heuristic in organizing 
information about people and events. Even if a non-oppositional alternative 
proved significant on Form C, if the oppositional alternative was chosen 
significantly more often when paired against this alternative, oppositionaJity 
would again appear to be a logic fundamental to cognitive organization. 
The Chi Square analyses revealed that, on Form A. the oppositional 
alternative was chosen significanUy more often for 10 of the 30 items. whereas 
the non-oppositional alternative was chosen significanUy more often for only 
three of the 30 items ( x2 • 3 .841, df = 1. p < 0 .0~ for all significant items ) . On 
Form B. the oppositional alternative was chosen significanUy more often for 12 
of the 30 items. with the non-oppositional alternative being selected 
significanUy more often for only one of the items cx2 .. 3.841. df ... 1. p < 0.0~ for 
all significant items). These results are presented in Table 2 (see Appendix A for 
a complete listing of the items and the significance levels for each of the 
preferred alternatives for items on which such a selection bias emerged). As 
mentioned above. however, the most decisive test of our hypothesis lies in the 
comparison of any significant differences between the two non-oppositional 
alternatives arising on Form C and significant differences favoring the same 
non-oppositional alternative on either Form A or B. Significant differences 
favoring one or the other of the non-oppositional alternatives on Form C cx2 • 
3.841. df = 1, p <0.0') emerged on a total of 16 items. However, in 12 of these 16 
cases, the oppositional alternative was chosen significanUy more often than the 
alternative displaying a significant selection preference on Form C when the 
two were tested against mll. 2lllu. on either Form A or Form B. In only QU. case 
did the non-oppositional alternative chosen significanUy more often on Form C 
prove to be chosen significanUy more often than the oppositional alternative 
represented on Forms A and B. This item, number 19 on the scale (see Appendix 
A), is as follows: 
Roy did not eat his doughnut with his breakfast. 
1) Roy ate his doughnut with his evening meal. (oppositional) 
Tuble..2. f s · if' S 1 · P " " 0 · · al d N\Jmber 011n 1cante ection Je1erences iorppoS1tion an 
Ngn-oppositional Alternatives on Forms A and B of the Implications Seate 
Form A 
FormB 
Type of Selection Preference 
Oppositional No.o.-oppositio.o.al 
N % Total N % Total 
10* 
12* 
3* 
l* 
10% 
34' 
*2 < 0.0'.). Note: There was a total of 30 items o.o. each form of the Scale. 
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Z) Roy ate his doughnut with his midnight snack. 
3) Roy ate his doughnut with his lunch.* 
The starred alternative, number three. represents the non-oppositional 
alternative which was chosen significanUy more often on both Form C (tested 
against the non-oppositional alternative labeled as number two, above) and on 
form A (tested against the oppositional alternative labeled as number one, 
above). The remaining three cases where the logic of oppositionality failed to 
be the most powerful heuristic were item numbers 6, 11. and 16 on the scale (see 
Appendix Al, in respective order as follows: 
john did not start his new job in the Summer. 
1) john started his new job in the Winter. (oppositional) 
2) john started his new job in the Fall. 
3) john started his new job in the Spring.* 
Bob refuses to work overtime. 
1) Bob would like to find another job. (oppositional) 
Z) Bob tires easily. 
3) Bob is holding down two jobs.* 
Barry threw up his hands. but not as a gesture of victory. 
1) Barry was indicating defeat. (oppositional) 
Z) Barry was indicating frustration. 
3) Barry was indicating exhaustion.* 
Although the starred non-oppositional alternative was chosen significanUy 
more often on Form C in all three cases listed above, no significant selection 
preference arose when it was tested against the oppositional alternative. 
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Tb.us. in 7'44 of the cases in which a selection bias favo.ring one o.r the othe.r of 
the non-oppositional alte.rnatives a.rose on Fo.rm C, the heu.ristic powe.r of 
0ppositionality ove.r.rode this p.refe.rence. 
Ove.rall. then, the findings strongly support ou.r p.rediction that. 
oppositionality is a .key heu.ristic in .reasoning f.rom p.remises f.ramed in a 
.oegational fashion. Fo.r 304' of the items on Fo.rm A and 404' of the items on 
Fo.rm B, subjects chose the oppositional alte.rnative significantly mo.re often 
than eithe.r of the non-oppositional alte.rnatives. Most impo.rtanUy, 
oppositionality was a mo.re powe.rful heu.ristic than significant selection biases 
favo.ring one of the non-oppositional alte.rnatives on Fo.rm C in all but fou.r 
cases. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that. the t.rend towards selecting the oppositional 
alte.rnative on Fo.rms A and B will be mo.re significant fo.r the t~ items f.ramin.g 
di.rect implications than fo.r the 1' f.raming indi.rect implications. Out of the 22 
items in which the oppositional alte.rnative was chosen significantly mo.re 
often, 10 of them we.re di.rect and 12 we.re indi.rect. This diffe.rence failed to 
.reach significance; hence, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Elpe.riment II: Movin1 an lm.p.ression Oppositjona11Y folloyinl Info.rmation that 
is Presented as a Ne1ation 
The e1pe.rimenta1 hypothesis fo.r Elpe.riment II p.redicted that. subjects who 
.received additional info.rmation p.resented in a negationat to.rm would evidence 
a g.reate.r change of opinion than those who .received the same inf o.rmation 
f.ramed non-negationally. Thus the dependent variable in Elpe.riment II was 
the diffe.rence sco.re obtained by subt.racting the subject's initial .rating along 
the pe.rsonality U. e., int.rove.rsion-en.rave.rsion) o.r cha.racte.r U. e., 
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selfish-unselfish) dimensions from their second rating along these dimensions. 
As ouUined above, the second rating was made following the presentation of 
additional information which contradicted the initial judgment and which was 
framed in either negational or non-negational form. Thus, the larger the 
difference score obtained, the greater the change in opinion. Since the ratings 
were made along a 25-point scale, the possible range of absolute values for the 
difference score was from~ to Zi. In actuality, the difference scores ranged in 
absolute value from D..ll to ill. The absolute value of this difference score was 
used in all cases except those in which the second rating was made in a direction 
opposite than that expected. For example, if a subject initially rated the target as 
selfish, he or she would subsequenUy receive additional information describing 
the target in wholly unselfish terms: thus it would be expected that the second 
rating would be made in the direction of the "unselfish" end of the dimension. 
However, if in this case the subject rated the target as mm selfish than he or 
she had initially, the resulting difference score would be assigned a negative 
value. Actually, only four subjects evidenced a change in opinion in the 
direction opposite that expected, and all of these were in Sample 2 
(selfish-unselfish). 
As will be described in more detail below, the difference scores were 
submitted to a 2 (sex) X2 (negation vs. non-negation) X2 (introversion vs. 
extraversion in Sample 1: selfish vs. unselfish in Sample 2) factorial analysis of 
variance. All the variables in the experiment are between-subject's variables. 
As described above, Experiment II actually consisted of two separate studies, one 
in which the target was described in terms of the personality dimension 
introversion - extraversion, and one in which the target was described in terms 
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of the character dimension selfish - unselfish. We wUl t&t.e up the results from 
these two samples (hereafter referred to as Samples 1and2) separately below. 
5g.mple QM.: Int.roversion - Eitraversion 
In the first of these studies. then. the factors in the design included se1. 
direction of the initial rating Cintroversion-eltraversion ), and form of the 
secondary information (negation - non-negation). CThe raw data can be found 
in Appendil C). Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the 
difference scores arrayed according to e1perimental condition. The number of 
subjects in each condition was approlimatety equal, with 23 subjects in the 
extraversion-negation condition (12 females, 11 males), 21 subjects in the 
extraversion - non-negation condition (11 females, 10 males), 20 subjects in the 
introversion-negation condition (10 females. 10 males), and 21 subjects in the 
introversion - non-negation condition 00 females, 11males). 
The hypothesis for Experiment II predicts that subjects who mate an 
initial judgment about the relative presence or absence of (in this case) a 
personality trait in a target person. and who are given secondary information 
which contradicts their initial judgment. will evidence a greater change in 
opinion when the secondary information is framed as a negation than when it 
lacks this negational quality. This hypothesis can be tested in the main effect 
for negation vs . .non-negation. As can be seen in Table 4, only one comparison 
between means reached significance, reflected in the strong main effect for 
negation - non-negation (f • 8.674, df • 1. p < 0.004). There were .no other 
significant main effects nor were there any significant interactions. 
Since a main effect for negation - non-negation was obtained, we 
conducted a Duncan Multiple Range analysis in order to determine which mean 
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Ife'.!!;\J1~ Standard Deviations of Difference Scores for Introversion vs. 
t1wivers1on 
Form of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
CSD) 
Non-negation 
(SD) 
Initial Rating of Personality 
lo.troversion Extra version 
12.26 
(3.62) 
9.02 
(4.29) 
13.02 
(3.80) 
11.12 
(4.50) 
Note: The larger the difference score, the greater the change from the initial 
rating to the second rating. 
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Iah1ej .uaJisi~ o[ Y1:dan~e 21.the Di!f~[enc~ S~QCH b! Int.r2y~rsi2n y~. Ertmnai2n. 
,N.esatio.o. vs. Non-ne1ation, and Su 
Sum of Mean Sig 
source of Variation Squares DF Square F off 
Main effects 224.439 3 74.813 4.491 .006 
I-E 39.958 1 39.958 2.399 .126 
NEG 144.489 1 144.489 8.674 .004 
SEX <t3.885 1 43.885 2.634 .109 
2-Way Interactions l~.131 3 5.044 .303 .823 
1-E NEG 9.103 1 9.103 .546 .462 
1-E SEX 6.059 1 6.059 .364 .548 
NEG SEX 0.130 1 0.130 .008 .930 
3-Way Interactions 3.076 1 3.076 .185 .669 
1-E NEG S.EX 3.076 1 3.076 .185 .669 
Explained 242.646 7 34.664 2.081 .056 
Residual 1282.660 72 16.658 
Total 1525.306 79 18.158 
differences were significant. This analysis revealed that the means rank. 
ordered as predicted, with the mean of Extravert- Negation group CI• 13.02) 
ranted above lhatof t.he Extravert-Non-negation group (I· 11.12). and the 
01ean the Introvert - Negation group (I• 12.4'7) ranked above that of the 
Introvert- Non-negation group (I• 9.02). The only difference between these 
pairs that proved significant (alpha• 0.0~). however, was that between the 
Introvert- Negation and Introvert- Non-negation groups. 
In order to be certain that the significant main effect did indeed reflect 
the influence of the experimental manipulation Ci. e., negational vs. 
non-negational additional information). it was important to confirm that the 
subjects in these two groups came from the same population (or were, in other 
words, truly randomly assigned to either the negational or non-negational 
conditions). Thus, we needed to determine whet.her the subjects who had 
received additional information framed in negational Corm differed 
significanUy on their initial rating along the introversion-elt.raversion 
dimension from subjects who received additional information framed in a 
non-negational manner. To test this, we conducted a 2 (negation vs. 
non-negation) 12 (introversion vs. elt.raversion) factorial analysis of variance 
on the first rating the subjects made along the introversion-extra.version 
dimension. The test of whet.her or not the subjects came from the same 
population would be interpreted in the interaction between 
introversion-extraversion and negation - non-negation. Table' presents the 
means and standard deviations of the first rating arrayed according to 
eiperimental condition. 
6S 
:flble 1 d S d d De · • f I . E . I . . 1 R . Means ant.an ar v1at1ons ontrover51on -1travewonnrt1Laun1s 
Arrayed According to Negation vs. Non-negation 
Form of Additional 
In.formation 
Negation 
(SD) 
Non-negation 
CSD) 
Initial Rating of Personality 
Introversion E1traversion 
16.91 
(1.92) 
lS.76 
(1.90) 
7.77 
U.86) 
6.86 
(2.77) 
~: The initial ratings were made along the dimension introversion -
extraversion, ranging from zero ("extrave.rted") to 2S ("introverted"). Subjects 
ma.king an initial rating below the midpoint of 13 are characterized as 
belonging to the "extrave.rsion" group, whereas those ma.king an initial .rating 
above the midpoint are characterized as belonging to the "introversion" group. 
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The analysis of variance did reveal a significant main effect for negation -
non-negation (f • 4.964, df • 1. p < 0.029); however, the interaction term between 
intr0version-e1traversion and negation - non-negation failed to reach 
significance (F • 0.063. df • 1. p < 0.803). Since the significant main effect 
reflects the effect of negation - non-negation coUapsed across the 
intr0version-e1traversion condition, it is not clearly interpretable until we take 
some purely statistical factors into consideration. Note that in collapsing across 
the intrOversion-extraversion conditions, the means on which the main effect 
is based reflect the adding of ratings which began on the introverted side of the 
dimension (right side of the midpoint) to ratings which began on the 
enraverted side of the dimension (left side of the midpoint). Thus. the most that 
the significant main effect can tell us "as such" is that the distribution of the 
negational group falls slightly to the right of the distribution for the 
non-negational group. To ascertain whether a consistent bias in the magnitude 
of the first rating occurred between the t'Wo groups, we must examine the means 
and standard deviations of the initial rating for the four sub-groups of 
subjects--that is, the introverted-negation group, the introverted -
non-negation group, the e1traverted-negation group, and the extraverted -
non-negation group. 
The means in Table '.5 show that those subjects whose initial rating fell on 
the introverted side of the dimension and vho got additional information 
framed in negational terms ()1•16.91. m •I .92) did, on the average, start 
farther away from the midpoint of the scale (13) than those subjects vho also 
rated the target as introverted initially, but vho got additional information 
framed in a non-negational fashion ()1•l,.76.SD.=1.90). This suggests that 
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subjects in the introversion-negation group had a greater distance to move 
along the scale when making their second rating than did the introversion -
non-negation group. Although this finding is in the direction of the effect 
predicted by the experimental hypothesis and might suggest the presence of a 
sampling artifact which could account for the findings. this bias is essentially 
canceled out by a bias in the opposite direction for the extraverted-negation and 
e1traverted - non-negation groups. Thus, when we examine the means of the 
initial ratings for extra.verted - negation <M "'7.n. ~ • 1.86) and ei:traverted -
non-negation <M • 6.86, ~ • 2.n> groups, we see that the subjects who received 
n.on-negational additional information had farther to move in this case. The 
cancelling effect of the two contrasting biases is reflected in the 
non-significant interaction between introversion-extra.version and negation -
non-negation mentioned above ff• .063. df • l, p < 0.803). 
Finally, we were interested in examining the relationship between the 
likableness-disli.tableness ratings and the second rating which the subjects 
made along the introversion-ei:traversion dimension. If such an analysis were 
to reveal a significant positive correlation between these two sets of ratings, it 
might suggest either one of two things--that the subject's affective assessment 
of the target (as measured by their lite-dislike rating) was reflective of feelings 
towards the target based on all the information they had been presented with, 
or that the likeableness-disli.keableness rating reflected an affective assessment 
(presumably based on their first judgment about the target) which had 
influenced the direction and magnitude of their second rating. In the first case. 
it would be the content w form of the information on which the affective 
assessment was based; in the second case, it would be the affective assessment 
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•hich determined the magnitude of change--thus. the second explanation could 
be framed as a competing one with the experimental hypothesis. Table 6 
presents the means and standard deviations of the like-dislike ratings arrayed 
according to experimental condition. AZ (introversion vs. e:itraversion) by Z 
(negation vs. non-negation) analysis of variance conducted on the like-dislike 
ratings did not reveal any significant differences among the mean like-dislike 
ratings as a function of negaUonal versus non-negaUonal phrasing of the 
additional information ff= 0.106. df = 1. p < 0.7<f,). It is worth noting that 
although the negational versus non-negational phrasing of the additional 
information did have a significant effect on the dimension of interest (i.e .. 
introversion-extraversion ), it had no such effect on the important but 
irrevelant dimension of li.k.e-disli.k.e. 
Table 7 presents the within-cell correlations of the li.k.e-disli.k.e rating 
with the second rating along the introversion-extraversion dimension. These 
ratings are informative in that they demonstrate that the second rating was not 
highly correlated with the li.k.e-dislik.e ratings, and thus the affective 
assessment hypothesis cannot be put forth as an alternative explanation for the 
positive findings. 
overall. then, these results clearly provide strong support for our 
hypothesis that subjects will evidence a greater change of opinion. moving 
more towards the end of the dimension opposite their initial rating, when 
presented with contradictory information framed negationally than when 
presented with the same information framed in a non-negationa1 manner. 
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I:i!:t and Standard Deviations of the Like-Dislike Ratings Arrayed According to 
.IAtroversion vs. Extraversion and Negation vs. Non-negation 
form of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
(SD) 
Non-negation 
CSD) 
Initial Rating of Personality 
Introversion Enraversion 
8.22 
(.f.06) 
8.31 
(3.36) 
9.63 
(<f.25) 
10.10 
(3.82) 
Note: The like-dislike ratings were made along a dimension of like-dislike, 
ranging from zero ("likable") to 25 ("dislikable"). These ratings were made 
after the second rating along the introverted-extraverted dimension. 
Tublef. Be L'k D'l'k R. d h S d 
'2rre at1onstwee.n1 e-1s 1 eat1ngs an t eecon 
fatroversion-Extraversion Ratings Arrayed According to Introversion ys. 
£1traversion and Ne&ation vs. Non-negation 
Initial Rating of Personality 
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Introversion Extra version 
Form of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
Non-negation 
-0.0340 
0.2652 
0.2791 
-0.0714 
.N:21t: A positive correlation within a condition reflects that as the second rating 
along the introversion-extraversion dimension moved more towards the 
"extraverted" end of the dimension. the like-dislike rating tended to move more 
towards the "likable" end of the dimension, and as the second rating moved more 
towards the "introverted" end of the dimension. the like-dislike rating tended to 
move more towards the "dislikable" end of the dimension. A negative 
correlationwithin a condition reflects that as the second rating along the 
introversion-extraversion dimension moved more towards the "extraverted" end 
of the dimension. the like-dislike rating tended to move more towards the 
"dislikable" end of the dimension. and as the second rating moved more towards 
the "introverted" end of the dimension, the like-dislike rating tended to move 
more towards the "likable" end of the dimension. 
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s_a,mple In: Selfish - Unselfish 
With the second of these two samples, ve vere interested in replicating 
the findings concerning the differential effect of negational vs. 
non-negational information on opinion change using a character trait 
description instead of a personality trait description of the target. Thus, in this 
second sample, the factors in the design included sex, direction of the initial 
rating (selfish-unselfish), and form of the additional information (negation -
non-negation). (The rav data can be found in Appendix C). The number of 
subjects in each condition vas approximately equal, vith 23 subjects in the 
unselfish-negation condition ( 10 females, 13 males), 26 subjects in the unselfish 
- non-negation condition (14 females, 12 males), 24 subjects in the 
selfish-negation condition ( 11 females, 13 males), and 21 subjects in the selfish -
non-negation condition (10 females, 11 males). As in Sample 1, the dependent 
variable was the difference score obtained by subtracting the first rating along 
the dimension (in this case, selfish-unselfish) from the second rating made 
along the same dimension. Table 8 presents the means and standard deviations 
of the difference scores arrayed according to experimental condition. 
Our hypothesis predicts that subjects vho ma.te an initial judgment about 
the relative presence or absence of a character trait in a target person, and 
vho are given additional information vhich contradicts their initial judgment, 
will evidence a greater change in opinion vhen the additional information is 
framed as a negation than when itlacts this negational quality. This 
hypothesis can be tested in the main effect for negation vs. non-negation. As 
can be seen in Table 9, the analysis of variance did not reveal a main effect for 
negation - non-negation ff • 1.983. df • 1, p < 0.163). nor did it reveal any other 
=and Standard Deviations of Difference Scores for Selfish ys. Unselfish 
Initial Rating of Personality 
Form of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
CSD) 
Non-negation 
CSD) 
Selfish Unselfish 
11.92 
(4.95) 
9.00 
(6.~6) 
12.02 
(4.28) 
11.44 
(~.~4) 
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Note: The larger the difference score. the greater the change from the initial 
.rating to the second rating. 
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=is o[ V~ri1nce of the Di[ference S!',;Qres by Selfish v~. Un~elfish, N1gati211 
Ji.Non-negation. and Sex 
Sum of Mean Sig 
Sou.rce of V a.riation Squa.res DF Squa.re F ofF 
Ma.in effects 126.423 3 12.141 1.428 .240 
u-s 38.744 1 38.744 1.313 .255 
NEG 61.941 1 61.941 2.099 .151 
SEX 27.456 1 27.456 .930 .337 
Z-Way Interactions 61.652 3 20.'.)Sl .696 .5'7 
U-S NEG 33.419 1 33.419 1.132 .290 
u-s SEX 8.5'1 1 8.5'1 .290 .S92 
NEG SEX 20.14'7 1 20.147 .683 .4'11 
3-Way Interactions .S32 1 .S32 .018 .893 
u-s NEG SEX .532 1 .S32 . 018 .893 
Explained 188.608 7 26.944 .913 .sot 
Residual 2537.999 86 29.512 
Total 2726.606 93 29.318 
significant main effects or any significant interactions. 
It was important to confirm that the subjects in. these two groups did 
indeed come from the same population (or, were randomly assigned to either the 
negational or non-negation.al conditions). since a non-random assignment of 
subjects to groups might possibly have influenced the results in the direction of 
non-significance. Thus, we needed to determine whether the subjects who had 
received additional information framed in negation.al form differed 
significanUy on their initial rating along the selfish-unselfish dimension from 
subjects who received secondary information framed in a non-negation.al 
manner. To test this, we conducted a 2 (negation vs. non-negation) 12 (selfish 
vs. unselfish) factorial analysis of variance on the first rating the subjects 
made along the introversion-eltraversion dimension. <Table 10 presents the 
means and standard deviations of the initial ratings arrayed according to 
experimental condition.) The test of whether or not the subjects came from the 
same population would be interpreted in the interaction between 
selfish-unselfish and negation non-negation. The analysis of variance did not 
reveal a significant main effect for negation - non-negation (f • 0.009, df • 1. p < 
0.926), nor did it reveal a significant interaction term between selfish-unselfish 
and negation - non-negation CF• 0.138, df • 1, p < 0.711). Thus, it can be safely 
assumed that the subjects were randomly assigned to either one or the other of 
the negation - non-negation conditions. 
Finally, we were interested in e:.u.mining the relationship between the 
Hkableness-disli.kableness ratings and the second rating which the subjects 
made along the selfish-unselfish dimension. If such an analysis were to reveal 
r::.;~nd Standard Deviations of Selfish-Unselfish Initial Ratinas Arrayed 
A,ccordi1lg to Negation vs. Non-negation 
Form of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
(SD) 
Non-negation 
(SD) 
Initial Rating of Personality 
Selfish Unselfish 
17.90 
(Z.77) 
17.60 
(3.-i7) 
7.37 
(Z.3Z) 
7 .:5-i 
(3.@) 
Note: The initiaJ ratiogswere made along the dimension selfish-unselfish, 
ranging from zero ("unseHish") to 2~ ("selfish"). Subjects making an initial 
rating below the midpoint of 13 are characterized as belonging to the 
"unselfish" group, whereas those making an initial rating above the midpoint 
are characterized as belonging to the "selfish" group. 
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a significant positive correlation between these two sets of ratings, it might 
sussest either one of wo things--that the subject's affective assessment of the 
&a.rset (as measured by their like-dislike rating) was reflective of feelings 
iowards the target based on all the information they had been presented with, 
or that the likableness-dislikableness rating reflected an affective assessment 
(presumably based on their first judgment about the target) which had 
influenced the direction and magnitude of their second rating. In the first case, 
it would be the content l:llll form of the information which determined the 
affective assessment; in the second case, it would be the affective assessment 
which determined the magnitude of change--thus, the second explanation could 
be framed as a competing one with the experimental hypothesis. Table 11 
presents the means and standard deviations of the like-dislike ratings arrayed 
according to experimental condition. Consistent with what one might have 
predicted, we can see that subjects who initially rated the target as selfish and 
received additional information describing the target in wholly unselfish terms 
saw him or her as much more likable than did those subjects who initially rated 
the target as unselfish and received additional information describing the 
target in wholly selfish terms. 
Table 12 presents the within-cell correlations of the like-dislike rating 
with the second rating along the selfish-unselfish dimension. These ratings are 
informative in that they demonstrate that the second rating was highly 
correlated with the like-dislike ratings in three of the conditions: 
selfish-negation, selfish - non-negation, and unselfish - non-negation. Thus, it 
r 
' 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Like-Dislike Ratings Ar.rayed Acco.rdina to 
~tfish vs. Unselfish and Negation vs. Non-negation 
Form of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
(SD) 
Non-negation 
(SD) 
Initial Rating of Personality 
Selfish Unselfish 
6.83 
(3.62) 
9.07 
(5.49) 
18.20 
(4.86) 
17.90 
(6.04) 
Note: The like-dislike .ratings we.re made along a dimension of like-dislike, 
ranging from zero ("likable") to 25 ("dislikable"). These .ratings were made 
after the second rating along the selfish-unselfish dimension. 
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~~;:1~tons Between Like-Dislike Ratings and the Second Selfish-Unselfish 
BJ.tings Arfayed Accordin1 to Selfish vs. Unselfish and Negation ys. 
ff.on-negation 
fo.rm of Additional 
Information 
Negation 
Non-negation 
Initial Rating of Personality 
Selfish Unselfish 
0.2163 
0.9032* 
0.8292* 
o.n36* 
* n. < 0.001. ~: A positive co.r.relation within a condition .reflects that as the 
second rating along the selfish-unselfish dimension moved mo.re towards the 
"unselfish" end of the dimension. the like-dislike rating tended to move mo.re 
towards the "likable" end of the dimension, and as the second .rating moved mo.re 
towards the "selfish" end of the dimension. the like-dislike .rating tended to 
move mo.re towards the "dislikable" end of the dimension. 
79 
does appear that some systematic relationship between the like-dislike ratings 
and the second ratings made along the selfish-unselfish dimension exists. The 
possible interpretation(s) of this relationship will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter V. 
Chapter;) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The present research sought to extend the tenets and findings of logical 
learning theory to the area of social inference and impression formation. 
Although much research has been motivated by a desire to understand the 
processes by which people mate educated guesses or draw inferences about 
their social world. the majority of such research has been informed by 
mediational theories of cognition. Instead of construing the processes 
underlying social inference as cognitive mechanisms mediated by 
environmental stimuli. our interest is in presenting an alternative. 
predicational account of such processes--an account capable of incorporating 
the notion of people as able to reason both demonstratively and dialectically 
(oppositionally) in framing attributions. In so doing, we sought to take a 
further step (see Rychlat.. 1987) towards validating a conceptual distinction 
between inference and implication as two forms of social reasoning. In 
developing a scheme for presenting information in such a way as to potentiate 
the drawing of implications, we appropriated Aristotle's (1~2) concept of 
negation. In reasoning from premises framed in a negational fashion. subjects 
had to reason from premises which did not have clear or certain demonstrative 
meaning; thus. subjects had to rely upon some strategy (or strategies) for 
predicting the intended meaning of such statements. 
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The two experiments carried out ill this thesis were designed to test 
hypotheses relevant lo the position outlined above. Hypothesis 1 of the first 
experiment predicted that subjects who are asked to choose between two 
possibJe explanations for the behavior of an individual will, when the 
behavioral description is presented in the form of a negation, select the one of 
the two alternatives which is most opposite in meaning to the premise being 
negated ill the statement. Hypothesis 2 of the first study predicted that the 
expected effect outlined in Hypothesis 1 would be stronger for the direct 
implications than for the indirect implications. 
As described in Chapter IV, the Chi Square analyses were performed on the 
items of Forms A, B. and C. These analyses revealed that the oppositional 
alternative "Was chosen significantly more often for 304' of the items on Form A 
and for 404' of the items on Form B. The most definitive test of our hypothesis 
also revealed supportive results. in that in 7'4' of the cases in which a selection 
bias favoring one or the other of the non-oppositional alternatives appeared on 
Form C. the heuristic power of oppositionality overrode this preference. Thus. 
the overaJl findings strongly support our prediction that oppositionality is a 
key heuristic in the drawillg of implications. 
Of the four cases which went aaainst Hypothesis 1, only one case (item 19 
of the scale) arose in which the selection preference for a non-oppositional 
alternative (selected significantly more often on Form C) clearly overrode a 
selection preference for the oppositional alternative. In this illstao.ce. the 
alternative chosen significantly more often seems to reflect a clear 
(non-oppositional) cultural bias. 
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In each of the othe.r th.ree cases that went against Hypothesis 1 the.re was 
also a selection p.refe.rence fo.r one of the non-oppositional alternatives on Fo.rm 
C; however. since the.re was no selection p.refe.rence fo.r the oppositional 
alternative exhibited on either of Forms A o.r B. the most decisive test could not 
be conducted. In these instances which went against the hypothesis it is not 
clear whether some shared cultural bias was underlying the subjects' selection 
p.refe.rences. o.r whether the alternatives designated as oppositional we.re 
perhaps not as clearly opposite in meaning to the premise being negated as 
they could have been. Future .research in this a.rea could be preceded by 
supplemental pilot wo.rk in o.rde.r to develop additional statements with clear 
opposites. 
Although Hypothesis 1 .received strong support, Hypothesis 2 concerning 
the direct versus indirect items was not supported. This could possibly be due to 
the difficulty in composing direct oppositional items which did not appear 
somewhat simplistic. An example of one such item is as follows: 
Debbie neve.r parked he.r car at the f.ront of the parking garage. 
Debbie parked he.r car at the .rear of the garage. (oppositional) 
Debbie parked he.r car at the middle of the garage. 
Debbie parked he.r car at the side of the garage. 
These items might have prompted subjects to .react "oppositionally" and fail to 
mark what seemed the obvious o.r simple answer. 
The experimental hypothesis fo.r Experiment II predicted that subjects who 
.received additional information presented in a negational fo.rm would evidence 
a g.reate.r change of opinion than those who .received the same information 
framed non-negationally. Sample 1 consisted of subjects presented with 
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information describing the target in terms of the personality trait 
intr0version-e1traversion. The analysis of variance did reveal a strong main 
effect for negation - non-negation, supporting our hypothesis. No significant 
correlations were found between liking-disliking and the final ratings when 
examined for each of the conditions. Thus it appears that that the significant 
main effect was clearly the result of the negational versus non-negational 
framing of the information, and was not due merely to some affective 
assessment of the target, based on the initial information presented. Overall. 
the results from Sample 1 demonstrated strong support for our hypothesis. 
The Sample 2 results are more difficult to interpret. however. Sample 2 
consisted of subjects presented with information describing the target in terms 
of the character trait selfishness-unselfishness. This time. the analysis of 
variance did not reveal a main effect for negation - non-negation, nor did it 
reveal any significant interactions. The three positive correlations between 
the like-dislike ratings and the final ratings can perhaps shed some light on the 
reasons for this. 
Although we had no specific a priori hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the like-dislike scores and the subjects' second rating 
along the unselfish-selfish dimension. the findings of our correlational 
analysis did prove interesting and potentially instructive. The results revealed 
that. for the selfish-negation. selfish-non-negation, and unselfish -
non-negation conditions (where selfish and unselfish refer to the direction of 
the subjects' initial ratings). the lite-dislike ratings were highly correlated 
with the final ratings made along the selfish-unselfish dimension. The fact that 
all these correlations were positive reflects that as the second rating along the 
· selfish-unselfish dimension moved more towards the "unselfish" end of the 
dimension, the like-dislike rating tended to move more towards the "likable" end 
of the dimension. and as the second rating moved more towards the "selfish" end 
of the dimension, the like-dislike rating tended to move more towards the 
"dislikable" end of the dimension. 
One possible explanation of these three highly significant correlations 
could be derived from the fact that the character dimension of selfish-unselfish 
reflects the formation of a more "moral" and therefore perhaps more 
affectively-tinged judgment than does rating along the introversion-
extraversion dimension. In other words. the "personality" assessmentofan 
individual along the dimension iDrof"ersio.a-ert.raJ'lJrsio.arepresents much less 
of a consensually-validated value judgment than does the "characterological" 
assessment of a person along the dimension sel/'is.IJ- u.aself.is.IJ. Thus, the 
affective assessment of the selfish and unselfish behaviors described may have 
been potent enough to render the effect of the form of the information H. e ., 
negational versus non-negational) non-significant. 
The high correlations seem to suggest that the subjects' like-dislike rating 
reflected their affective assessment of the target based on all the information 
presented. at least as it was reinterpreted in light of the contradictory additional 
information the subjects received. Since we did not obtain initial like-dislike 
ratings from the subjects, assessing the exact nature of the relationship 
between the ratings of selfish-unselfish and the ratings of like-dislike is 
problematic. In addition. as is apparent in Table 11 (which displays the means 
of the like-dislike ratings according to experimental condition), there seems to 
be no systematic relationship between the form of the additional information 
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that subjects received--negational or non-negational--and the magnitude of the 
like-dislike ratings. These findings seem ultimately to suggest that when the 
target dimension is a highly evaluative one (such as is the case with the 
selfish-unselfish dimension) the resulting ratings along that dimension may 
reflect an affective assessment of the target which renders insignificant any 
potential effect of negational versus non-negational phrasing of the 
information. 
The strong positive correlations between the Sample 2 lite-dislike ratings 
and the second ratings along the selfish-unselfish dimension in three of the 
four conditions also suggest some questions that could be addressed in future 
research. Initially, one could attempt to replicate the results obtained with the 
Sample l (introversion-extra.version) subjects while using a dimension for 
which the moral connotation of the behaviors was not quite as strong as that for 
the selfish-unselfish dimension, but perhaps somewhat stronger than with the 
introversion-extra.version dimension. For example, ratings made along a 
dimension such as cautious-impulsive might reflect less of a moral judgment 
than those made along the selfish-unselfish dimension, but more of one than 
those made along the introversion-extraversion dimension. Instead of .mWng 
only one rating of lite-disli.te, subjects could make two ratings along this 
dimension--one just after their first rating along the personality dimension and 
one after their final rating. This slight modification in procedure would 
provide a clearer picture of the relationship between the two sets of ratings 
than that obtained using the present design. 
As discussed in Chapter II, research has shown that negative information 
often carries more weight than positive information does (Kanouse & Hansen, 
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1972). For example, when subjects are evaluating a target whose behavior 
involves attributes having moral connotations, the target's performance of a 
socially undesirable behavior often tends to have an overriding impact on the 
subject's overall judgment of the target on the particular dimension. This effect 
has been found to hold even when the socially undesirable behavior of the 
target is clearly inconsistent with the target's past behavior (Jones & Davis, 
1965). 
Such a negativity bias was not evident in our results, in that the 
difference for subjects who received additional information describing the 
target in selfish (negative) terms were not greater than those for subjects who 
received additional information describing the target in unselfish (positive) 
terms. Our experimental design is somewhat different than that employed in 
the studies finding negativity biases, however. Our design differed in that. 
although the additional information~ inconsistent with the direction of the 
subject's initial rating, it was Jl21 necessarilv wholly inconsistent with the 
initial information presented (which contained an equal number of statements 
describing the target in selfish and unselfish terms). However, in a future 
study it would be interesting to assess the effect of negational versus 
non-negational phrasing on the negativity biases as reported in the literature. 
Thus, in this context. one could assess whether negationally-framed negative 
information would have a greater impact on the formation of a negative 
impression than positive information (also framed negationally) would have on 
the formation of a positive impression. 
In the two experiments we conducted, we focused only on the drawing of 
oppositional implications from premises framed as negations. However, as 
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discussed in Chapter II. we do not claim that implications can only be drawn 
from premises framed in negational form. nor that they are always made to the 
opposite of the premise being negated. One example of an instance in which an 
implication may be drawn from information framed in a non-negational 
fashion is when someone is "damned by faint praise." Suppose that, after 
winning seven gold medals in the 1972 Olympics, Mark Spitz's coach had 
congratulated him with "nice job" or "good work." In this case the 
congratulatory remark, even though it is positive, is not quite on par with the 
magnitude of the accomplishment. Thus, since the praise ("nice job") does not 
quite fit with the assumed con ten (a record number of gold medals won by an 
individual), the recipie.nt.of such "praise" Cin this case, Mark Spitz) might not 
accept the statement as demonstratively "true;" instead, he might be led to 
wonder what was implied by such a statement. The implication he might 
ultimately draw could be an oppositional one (e.g., "My coach thinks I could 
have done better") or it could be non-oppositional (e.g., "My coach is holding a 
grudge against me for missing those last three practices"). 
Alternatively, a person might also be "damned by faint criticism." As an 
example. imagine that a teenager who is not of legal driving age takes the 
family car for a "joyride" one night and wrecks it in a ditch. His father fails to 
comment on the incident except to say "Try not to do it again." In this case, the 
son might expect his father to really take him to task for his irresponsibility. 
Although there a number of conclusions he could draw about why his father did 
not do so. including that his father was just being sympathetic and letti.ng him 
off easy this one time, he might conclude that his father's temperate remark 
implied an indifference or lack of concern about him. 
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The above examples highlight the fact that whether an inference or 
implication will be drawn. from a particular premise (statement, etc.) depends, 
in large part. upon the degree to which the reasoner views the premise as 
"primary and true" or as having demonstratively given meaning. This level or 
certainty regarding the demonstrative truth of the premise often. seems to be 
related to the appropriateness of the premise to the context in. which it arises. 
Although any given premise can, in. principle, stand as the point of departure 
for an inference, implication. or both, the sort of reasoning the individual 
ultimately en.gages in may be dependent on. how the premise "fits" with the 
con.text as the individual has been construing it. When the premise .d2n fit the 
individual's understanding of the con.ten. he or she may be most likely to accept 
the premise as demonstratively given and reason inferentially from it. 
However, when the premise does not seem to follow or "fit" the individual's 
understanding of the con.text. he or she may begin reasoning oppositionally in. 
order to discern what might be implied by such a premise. 
Studies designed to test our hypothesis that implications are drawn. from 
bnb,. premises framed as negations and premises framed in non-negation.al 
form, as well as studies designed to test. our hypothesis concerning the effect. of 
the "fit" between premises and their contexts (as construed by the reasoner) on 
the drawing of inferences versus implications could prove instructive in 
furthering our understanding of when people may tend to reason 
demonstratively and when they tend to reason oppositionally. One could design 
a study modeled on the "faint. praise" and "faint criticism" examples given 
above, using both non-negationally and negationally-framed "praise" and 
"criticism" statements, and manipulating the contexts so as to mate the 
statements seem alternately appropriate and inappropriate to the context. 
Through such a design, one could assess the hypothesized effects of the two 
types of phrasing and the "fit" with the context as described above. 
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Another possible line of investigation is suggested by the body of research 
concerning the relationship between reinforcement value and learning 
(summarized in Rychlak. 1988, Chapter 9). In his logical learning theory, 
Rychlak ( 1988) argues that affective assessment represents an individual's 
innate capacity to evaluate items of cognition in terms of like-dislike. 
Reinforcement value, an idiographic measurement of subjects' ratings of the 
likability of items (pictures. designs, words, trigrams, etc.>, is the 
methodological construct paralleling affective assessment. As studies in this 
line of research have illustrated, certain groups of subjects (e.g., alcoholics, 
persons diagnosed as schizophrenic) tend to learn words (trigrams, etc.) that 
they have rated as dislikable (i.e., words having negative reinforcement value) 
more readily than those they have rated as likable. This trend towards learning 
along the negative is in contrast to a positive reinforcement value effect (in 
which liked words or trigrams are learned more readily) obtained using 
subjects drawn from a "normal" population. 
Given that, for example. persons diagnosed as schizophrenic tend to learn 
more along the negative in terms of reinforcement value, one might 
hypothesize that they also tend to transform statements or premises into 
negational form more often than individuals from a "normal" population. Such 
individuals, when presented with a premise such as "He remained a bachelor" 
might cognitively transform this premise into a negation. such as "He never 
married." As a result. given our belief that premises framed as negations often 
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facilitate the drawing of implications, and especially implications to the 
opposite of the premise being negated, we might hypothesize that individuals 
dia.gnosed as schizophrenic would be more likely to draw oppositional 
implications from non-negationally framed premises than would "normal" 
controls. This hypothesis could be tested by presenting a group of individuals 
dia.gnosed as schizophrenic and a group of "normal" control subjects with a set 
of premises framed in a non-negational fashion and a set of alternative 
response choices for each non-negational premise. The set of alternative 
response choices for each item could include a "conclusion" which could be 
derived from drawing a direct inference from the premise, a conclusion which 
would exemplify a non-oppositional implication drawn from the negational 
form of the premise, and a conclusion which represented an oppositional 
implication derived from the negational form of the premise. One could then 
assess whether the individuals diagnosed as schizophrenic did, indeed, tend to 
draw more implications, and whether these implications tended to be 
oppositional ones. 
As should have been apparent after the discussion in Chapter II of existing 
theories of social cognition and impression formation, theorists from the 
mediational tradition have not been led to mate the sort of predictions 
concerning negation and oppositional reasoning that we have in the present 
research. This is not surprising, given that such theories are grounded solely 
on demonstrative assumptions. Since such theories do not postulate an innate 
capacity for oppositional reasoning, any instances of people reasoning to the 
opposite are viewed simply as additional phenomena to be explained in a 
demonstrative fashion. In the case where a person reasoning to the opposite 
91 
would contradict the predictions of such a theory, the theory's proponents can 
always make recourse to the person's idiosyncratic (mediated) learning history 
in an attempt to explain the "anomaly." 
Out of all the theories discussed in Chapter II, Anderson's (1981) 
information integration theory is the only one to e1pliciUy address the effect of 
different sorts of information on the formation of an overall impression. 
Although he does assert that items of information may be weighted differently 
in the process of forming an impression, his theory provides no a priori 
grounds for predicting that negationa1 information would carry more "weight" 
in the changing of an impression towards the opposite than would 
non-negationa1 information (as we predicted in Study II). Anderson could only 
come to such a conclusion based on an a posteriori interpretation of a pattern of 
results such as that obtained for Sample 1 of Study II. Thus, logical learning 
theory is the only account in the literature which provides the theoretical 
language necessary to capture the individual as oppositional reasoner. It 
provides the most parsimonious and logically consistent explanation of the 
results obtained in 'study I and vith Sample 1 of Study II. 
In conclusion, the results of the present thesis vere, overall. supportive of 
the tenets of logical learning theory. The predicational model ouUined by 
Rychla.i. ( 1988) provides a foundation for consideri.Jlg the human as a social 
reasoner making an l&1in. contribution to the construction of his or her social 
vorld. Logical learni.Jlg theory also provides the theoretical tools to transcend 
the circularity of many of the mediational accounts of social reasoni.Jlg. In 
addition, the more specific distinction between i.Jlference and implication and 
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different modes of reasoning in which they are grounded would appear to make 
a unique and instructive addition to the current, purely demonstrative accounts 
of social reasoning. 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
IMPLICATIONS AND INFERENCES SCALE 
Sometimes we hear one statement about a person, and based on this 
statement we can draw some inferences or implications concerning that 
person's behavior, motives, or personality style. For example, we might hear it 
said that "Greg is a loud talker and comments on every Hu.le thing." From this 
statement we might then form anopinion along a couple of lines, such as: 
Greg does not want to be misunderstood. 
Greg likes to be noticed by others. 
There are other implications or inferences possible. but in this task you 
will be asked to select the best of two possible alternatives. This scale has 30 
items, each with a statement about a person and two options to select from, as 
follows: 
Virginia never accepts the blame for anything when it goes wrong. 
__A. Virginia .knows that she is frequently at fault. 
-B. Virginia is a very careful planner of things. 
Your job is to read each of the 30 items on the scale, and then to place an 
"X" or check-mark on either "A" or "B" alternative based on your best hunch. 
Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers to these items. People 
differ in the inferences and implications they draw about others. We are 
interested in your personal opinion based on your best judgment. 
READ EACH STATEMENT AND SELECT EITHER "A" OR "B" AS YOUR CHOICE. 
IF YOU HA VE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND. 
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INFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS SCALE 
1) Frank never takes his shirt off in public. 
Form A alternatives: A. Frank catches cold easily. 
B. Frank is ashamed of his physique. 
(oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Frank is ashamed of his physique. 
(oppositional) 
B. Frank sunburns easily. 
Form C alternatives: A. Frank catches cold easily. 
B. Frank sunburns easily. 
2) Charloue's face reflected an emotional mood, but it was not happiness. 
Form A alternatives: A. Charloue was sad.* (oppositional) 
B. Charloue was angry. 
Form B alternatives: A. Charloue was relieved. 
B. Charloue was sad.* (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Charloue was relieved. 
B. Charloue was angry.* 
3) Beth does not laugh at off-color jokes. 
Form A alternatives: A. Beth has moral scruples. (oppositional) 
B. Beth has no sense of humor. 
Form B alternatives: A. Beth is a very shy person. 
B. Beth has moral scruples. (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Beth has no sense of humor. 
B. Beth is a very shy person. 
<f) Betsy did not raise her eyes 
Form A alternatives: A. Betsy looked straight ahead. 
B. Betsy lowered her eyes. (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Betsy lowered her eyes. (oppositional) 
B. Betsy looked to the side. 
Form C alternatives: A. Betsy looked to the side. 
B. Betsy looked straight ahead. 
') Malcolm refuses to ride in an elevator. 
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Form A alternatives: A. Malcolm has claustrophobia.* (oppositional) 
B. Malcolm is an exercise enthusiast. 
Form B alternatives: A. Malcolm distrusts machinery. 
B. Malcolm has claustrophobia.* (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Malcolm is an exercise enthusiast.* 
B. Malcolm distrusts machinery. 
6) John did not start his new job in the Summer. 
Form A alternatives: A. John started his new job in the Fall.* 
B. John started his new job in the Winter. 
(oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: 
Form C alternatives: 
A. john started his new job in the Winter. 
(oppositional) 
B. john started his new job in the Spring. 
A. john started his new job in the Spring.* 
B. john started his new job in the Fall. 
7) Rick gave a signal. but it was not to "retreat" 
Form A alternatives: A. Rick's signal was to "advance." (oppositional) 
B. Rick's signal was to "stay in place." 
Form B alternatives: A. Rick's signal was to "get ready." 
B. Rick's signal was to "advance." (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Rick's signal was to "stay in place." 
B. Rick's signal was to "get ready." 
8) Linda never hangs up her clothes. 
Form A alternatives: A. Linda's clothes are hung up by her roommate. 
B. Linda's clothes can be seen draped over 
furniture. (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Linda's clothes can be seen draped over 
furniture. (oppositional) 
B. Linda sends her clothes directly to the 
laundry. 
Form C alternatives: A. Linda sends her clothes directly to the 
laundry. 
B. Linda's clothes are hung up by her roommate. 
9) Wendy did not order spicy food from the menu. 
Form A alternatives: A. Wendy ordered mild food from the menu.* 
(oppositional) 
B. Wendy ordered rich food from the menu. 
Form B alternatives: A. Wendy ordered tangy food from the menu. 
B. Wendy ordered mild food from the menu.* 
(oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Wendy ordered rich food from the menu.* 
B. Wendy ordered tangy food from the menu. 
10) Anne did not pick the apples from the upper branches of the tree. 
Form A alternatives: A. Anne picked the apples from the middle 
branches of the tree. 
B. Anne picked the apples from the tower 
branches of the tree.* (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Anne picked the apples from the tower 
branches of the tree.* (oppositional) 
B. Anne picked the apples from among those 
that had dropped to the ground. 
Form C alternatives: A. Anne picked the apples from among those 
that had dropped to the ground.* 
B. Anne picked the apples from the middle 
branches of the tree. 
11) Bob refuses to work overtime. 
Form A alternatives: A. Bob would like to find another job. 
(oppositional) 
B. Bob tires easily. 
Form B alternatives: A. Bob is holding down two jobs. 
B. Bob would like to find another job. 
(oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Bob tires easily. 
B. Bob is holding down two jobs.* 
12) Jack's rifle shots did not form a low pattern on the target. 
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Form A alternatives: A. Jack's rifle shots patterned to the right side. 
B. Jack's rifle shots patterned on the high side. 
(oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Jack's rifle shots patterned on the high side. 
(oppositional) 
B. Jack's rifle shots patterned to the left side. 
Form C alternatives: A. Jack's rifle shots patterned to the right side. 
B. Jack's rifle shots patterned to the left side. 
13) Peter did not applaud the actors at the final curtain of the play: 
Form A alternatives: A. Peter has seen beuer plays. (oppositional) 
B. Peter is reserving his judgment. 
Form B alternatives: A. Peter never openly demonstrates his feelings 
about things. 
B. Peter has seen beuer plays. (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Peter never openly demonstrates his feelings 
about things. 
B. Peter is reserving his judgment. 
14) Karen's expression was not that of cooperation. 
Form A alternatives: A. Karen's expression was that of disinterest. 
B. Iaren's e:a:pression was that of opposition.* 
(oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Karen's expression was that of opposition.* 
(oppositional) 
B. Karen's expression was that of confusion. 
Form C alternatives: A. Karen's expression was that of disinterest. 
B. Karen's espression was that of confusion.* 
15) Marta has never received a traffic ticket. 
Form A alternatives: A. Marta is a lucky driver. (oppositional) 
B. Marta is a careful driver. 
Form B alternatives: A. Marta drives infrequenUy. 
B. Marta is a lucky driver.* (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Marta drives infrequenUy. 
B. Marta is a careful driver.* 
101 
16) Barry threw up his hands, but not as a gesture of victory. 
Form A alternatives: A. Barry was indicating exhaustion. 
B. Bar.ry was indicating defeat. (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Barry was indicating defeat. (oppositional) 
B. Barry was indicating frustration.* 
Form C alternatives: A. Barry was indicating exhaustion.* 
B. Barry was indicating frustration. 
17) Bruce said he was not impressed by his friend's new car. 
Form A alternatives: A. Bruce envies his friend's new possession. 
(oppositional) 
B. Bruce has high standards for automobile 
performance. 
Form B alternatives: A. Bruce is a non-materialistic person. 
B. Bruce envies his friend's new possession. 
(oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Bruce is a non-materialistic person. 
B. Bruce has high standards for automobile 
performance. 
18) Laura has never disagreed with any of her parent's decisions. 
Form A alternatives: A. Laura has ve.ry sensible parents. 
B. Laura is a submissive person.* (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Laura is a submissive person.* (oppositional) 
B. Laura believes in cooperation. 
Form C alternatives: A. Laura has very sensible parents.* 
B. Laura believes in cooperation. 
19) Roy did not eat his doughnut with his breakfast. 
Form A alternatives: A. Roy ate his doughnut with his evening meal. 
(oppositional) 
B. Roy ate his doughnut with his lunch.* 
Form B alternatives: A. Roy ate his doughnut with his midnight 
snack.. 
B. Roy ate his doughnut with his evening meal.* 
(oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Roy ate his doughnut with his midnight 
snack.. 
B. Roy ate his doughnut with his lunch.* 
20) Lynn has never been seen out on a date. 
Form A alternatives: A. Lynn has consistenUy turned down dates. 
B. Lynn is an unpopular person.* 
(oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Lynn is u unpopular person.* 
(oppositional) 
B. Lynn's parents will not let her date. 
Form C alternatives: A. Lynn has consistenUy turned down dates. 
B. Lynn's parents will not let her date.* 
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21) Martin did not leave by the northern route out of town. 
Form A alternatives: A. Martin left by the southern route out of town. 
(oppositional) 
B. Martin left by the eastern route out of town. 
Form B alternatives: A. Martin left by the western route out of town. 
B. Martin left by the southern route out of town. 
(oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Martin left by the western route out of town. 
B. Martin left by the eastern route out of town. 
22) Roger was not complimented by his boss for doing a certain job. 
Form A alternatives: A. Roger's boss simply forgot to compliment him. 
B. Roger's boss thought the job was only fairly 
well done. (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Roger's boss thought the job was only fairly 
well done. (oppositional) 
B. Roger's boss does not believe in 
complimenting employees. 
Form C alternatives: A. Roger's boss simply forgot to compliment him. 
B. Roger's boss does not believe in 
complimenting employees. 
23) Debbie never parked her car at the front of the parking garage. 
Form A alternatives: A. Debbie parked her car at the rear of the 
garage. (oppositional) 
B. Debbie parked her car at the middle of the 
garage. 
Form B alternatives: A. Debbie parked her car at the side of the 
garage. 
B. Debbie parked her car at the rear of the 
garage. (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Debbie parked her car at the side of the 
garage. 
B. Debbie parked her car at the middle of the 
garage. 
2-t) Juan did not answer the question put to him by the teacher. 
From A alternatives: A. Juan is too self-conscious. 
B. Juan needs to study more.• (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Juan needs to study more. (oppositional) 
B. Juan was daydreaming. 
Form C alternatives: A. Juan is too self-conscious.• 
B. Juan was daydreaming. 
25) Sheila did not place her books on top of the table. 
Form A alternatives: A. Sheila placed her books below the table. 
(oppositional) 
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B. Sheila placed her books in front of the table. 
Form B alternatives: A. Sheila placed her books above the table. 
B. Sheila placed her books below the table. 
(oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Sheila placed her books below the table. 
26) Gait never leaves a tip. 
Form A alternatives: 
Form B alternatives: 
Form C alternatives: 
B. Sheila placed her books in front of the table. 
A. Gail is on a strict budget. 
B. Gail is a cheapskate. (oppositional) 
A. Gail is a cheapskate. (oppositional) 
B. Gail does not believe in the practice of 
tipping. 
A. Gail is on a strict budget. 
B. Gail does not believe in the practice of 
tipping. 
27) Mark did not smile when he looked at the picture. 
Form A alternatives: A. Mark frowned. (oppositional) 
B. Mark was expressionless.* 
Form B alternatives: A. Mark bit his lip. 
B. Mark frowned.* (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Mar.k bit his lip.* 
B. Mark was expressionless. 
28) Santos never takes the lead in social situations. 
Form A alternatives: A. Santos believes i.n group consensus. 
B. Santos is a follower.* (oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Santos is a foHower.* (oppositional) 
B. Santos likes to see others excel. 
Form C alternatives: A. Santos believes in group consensus.* 
B. Santos likes to see others excel. 
29) Walter told the officer that he did not see the red light change. 
Form A alternatives: A. Walter is lying.* (oppositional) 
B. Walter was blinded by the sun. 
Form B alternatives: A. Walter is usually preoccupied. 
B. Walter is lying.* (oppositional) 
Form C alternatives: A. Walter is usually preoccupied.* 
B. Walter was blinded by the sun. 
30) Susan looked for signs of tenderness but they did not materialize. 
Form A alternatives: A. Susan did see signs of self-consciousness. 
B. Susan did see signs of toughness. 
(oppositional) 
Form B alternatives: A. Susan did see signs of toughness. 
(oppositional) 
B. Susan did see signs of boredom. 
Form C alternatives: A. Susan did see signs of self-consciousness. 
B. Susan did see signs of boredom. 
~: *p<0.05 
10-t 
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DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
In this study ve •ere ill fact interested in how you frame inferences or 
drav implications. You "ftre in •aly one of three conditions. Some subjects 
took Form A of the INmINCES AND IMPLICATIONS SCALE. others took Form B. 
a.o.d still others took Form C. 
In Form A a.o. item would be phrased as follows: 
William's face reflected a.a emotion, but it was not sadness. 
_A. William was eicited. 
_ _....,.B, William was happy. 
lo. form B a.o. item vould be phrased as follows: 
William's face reflected a.o. emotion, but it was not sadness. 
_A. William was happy. 
__ B, William was embarrassed. 
In form Can item would be phrased as follows: 
Wi11iam's face reflected an emotion. but it was not sadness. 
_A. William was embarrassed. 
__ B, William was excited. 
According to our ei:perimental hypothesis, the alternative "William was happy" 
(i. e.,"B" in the Form A item and "A" in the Form B item) would be chosen 
significanUy more often than either of the other two alternatives. In addition, 
any consistent differences in the selection of alternatives on Form C should be 
overridden by what ve are callio.g the "oppositional" selection. (e. g., "Willia.m 
was happy") on Form. A and Form B. 
The hypothesis we are trying to investigate is that whenever something is 
negated, we tend to draw conclusions in the opposite direction of vhat is being 
negated. Sadness and happiness are opposites; therefore when we are presented 
with a statement negating Willia.m's experience of sadness, ve tend to think that 
his expression must reflect happiness, even though there are other plausible 
conclusions we could drav concerning his emotional expression. 
Please feel free to ask any questions you have concerning the experiment. Do 
you have any observations on this procedure? We would be interested in 
anythillg you would like to tell us about it. Thank you for your cooperation. 
APPENDIXB 
APPENDIIB 
WHAT SORT OF A PERSON IS ROBERT I JANn'? 
Let's imagine you have just finished high school. One of the young men in 
your class is named Robert, and you have heard different opinions concerning 
the sort of person he is. Some people think that he is an unselfish person, but 
just as many others feel that he is selfish. You have seen him around the school 
off and on for several years, and even before that you .knew him casually when 
you were both growing up. 
As you think about this question of whether Robert is selfish or unselfish. you 
can recall certain facts about him, as follows: 
He always volunteered to help out with school drives and to sell tickets for 
events. However. he was never willing to stop on his way to school and pick up 
friends who needed a ride. He never refused to share his lunch money, but was 
always seen pushing ahead of people in line. He did seem to mate an effort to be 
cheerful most of the time. But when things didn't go his way at basketball 
practice. he would just up and leave. He never let others borrow things such as 
pencils, pens. and notebook paper. But, he never refused to help his friends 
with their homework.. 
Based on these facts, please mart below whether you would agree with those 
who saw Robert as selfish, or with those who saw him as unselfish. Place an "X" 
at the point on the line below that represents DY.C.l>m judament .&inn..t.U. 
!Im DY. hl:!J.: 
unselfish selfish 
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ROBERT AITER A PASSAGE OF TIME 
Now let's imagine that several years have passed. years in which you have had 
the chance to lea.rn fu.rthe.r facts about Robe.rt first hand. He.re is what you now 
know about him first hand: 
Unselfish/Negation: 
He did not .refuse to do volunteer wo.rk in the community , 
when asked to do so. 
He neve.r missed an opportunity to assist his associates at wo.rk. 
He was not tight with his money. 
He did not hesitate to loan tapes and books to his neighbors. 
He was neve.r too busy to find time to go out with his friends. 
Unselfish/Non-negation: 
He was willing to do volunteer wo.rk in the community. when 
asked to do. 
He took eve.ry opportunity to assist his associates at wo.rk. 
He was generous with his money. 
He was willing to loan tapes and books to his neighbors. 
He always found time to go out with his friends. 
Selfish /Negation: 
He was not willing to do volunteer wo.rk in the community, when 
asked to do so. 
He neve.r offered assistance to his associates at wo.rk. 
He was not generous with his money. 
He was not willing to loan tapes o.r books to his neighbors. 
He neve.r found time to go out with his friends. 
Selfish/Non-neaation: 
He was .reluctant to do volunteer wo.rk in the community, when 
asked to do so. 
He avoided offering assistance to his associates at wo.rk. 
He was tight with his money. 
He was .reluctant to loan tapes o.r books to his neighbors. 
He was always too busy to find time to go out with his friends. 
Based on all the facts you have gathered ove.r the yea.rs, what would you now say 
about Robert's .relative selfishness o.r unselfishness? You may feel that you 
don't have enough information o.r would like to know mo.re. Howeve.r, please 
make you.r best judgment utilizing all the information given. Place an "I" at the 
point on the line below that .rep.resents you.r best judgment about Robe.rt: 
unselfish selfish 
Based on what you know about Robert's behavior, please let us know whether 
you would find such a person likable o.r dislikable. Place an "I" at the point on 
the line below that .rep.resents you.r best judgment about Robe.rt in te.rms of 
likableness o.r dislikableness: 
likable dislikable 
• f t I 1 I f I f f r t I I I t f I t t I I f f f 
Please list any thoughts you have about Robe.rt that explain why you gave him 
the th.ree .ratings you did. 
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DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
We are interested in studying how the way in which information is 
presented to people influences the types of conclusions they draw based on such 
information. In this study, you were initially presented with descriptive 
behavioral patterns of a target person. with an equal number of statements 
reflecting either introversion and extraversion or selfishness and 
unselfishness. We then asked you to take a position regarding this person's 
relative introversion-extraversion, or selfishness-unselfishness. We are not 
particularly interested in how you arrived at this first conclusion. We are 
interested, however. in looking at the how the way in which we presented the 
subsequent information affected the second judgment you made regarding the 
person's introversion/extraversion or selfishness/unselfishness. 
Let's say you were in the group which got information describing the 
target in terms of selfishness and unselfishness. and that you originally located 
the target on the "selfish" end of the rating continuum. We then presented you 
with information in contradiction to this position. i.e .. with information 
describing the target as unselfish. However. some of you received this 
information presented in the form of a negation (e. g., "Robert never refused to 
help others.") and some of youreceived this information presented in a 
non-negational fashion (e.g., "Robert was always willing to help others when 
asked."). An equivalent procedure was followed for thoseof you who originally 
rated the target as "unselfish." 
What are we trying to get at? Well, we feel that when the additional 
information you were given was framed as a negation, you were more likely to 
change your original opinion in the direction of the opposite opinion than if 
you were given additional information which was framed in a non-negational 
manner. We predict this to be the case even though you each received the asme 
information, just phrased in a different 'Way. We feel this will hold for 
information that is derived in a tentative or uncertain fashion.because of the 
role negation plays in suggesting oppositional implications. 
Please feel free to ask any questions you have. If you have any 
observations about the procedure, please don't hesitate to tell us about them. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
APPENDIIC 
APPENDIIC 
Raw. Data for Sample 1 of Experiment II 
(Sample 1 was composed of subjects who received information describing t.b.e 
target in terms of t.b.e personality trait introversion-enraversion.) 
Condition 1: Ia.iu1l R1un& Q{ I11tr2v~rted, AdditioAal Ia.f12rm1tion [ram.~d .a 
Ne1ation 
First Ratin & Sec2nd Ratina Difference Score Like-Dislike 
Male 
1) 16.0 2.0 14.0 7., 
2) cs.o 2.0 13.0 <f .0 
3) 17.0 1.0 16.0 12.0 
<f) 18.5 3.5 15.0 11.5 
5) 18.0 1.0 17.0 1.f.0 
6) 18.0 3.0 15.0 8.0 
7) 15.0 5,5 9.5 <f .0 
8) 13.5 3.S 10.0 3.0 
9) 19.0 11.0 8.0 9.5 
10) 19.5 2.S 17.0 16.0 
11) 17.0 3.0 14.0 7.5 
Female 
1) 1.f.0 9.5 <f .5 11.0 
2) 17.0 10.0 7.0 5.5 
3) 18.0 1.5 16.5 6.0 
<f) 15.0 3.0 12.0 <f .5 
5) 19.0 6.0 13.0 10.0 
6) 18.0 3.0 15.0 10.0 
7) 20.0 7.S 12.5 16.5 
8) 16.5 2.5 14.0 5.0 
9) 18.0 11.S 6.5 7.5 
10) 16.5 2.5 l<f.O 2.5 
11) 13.0 2.0 11.0 10.0 
12) 17.5 10.0 7.5 3., 
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Condit.i2n Z: Initial Ralina g[ lntrov~rted, Addi!ional h1C2rmation Framed 
Non-ne1ationaJly 
first RatiA& Second Ratina Difference Score Likt-Dislike 
Male 
1) 18.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 
2) 16.0 9.5 6.5 12.0 
3) 17.5 2.5 15.0 10.0 
4) 14.0 13.5 0.5 12.0 
5) 18.5 4.5 14.0 6.0 
6) 15.0 4.0 11.0 7.5 
7) 14.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 
8) 19.5 1.5 18.0 15.0 
9) 14.0 6.0 8.0 5.0 
10) 16.0 7.0 9.0 4.0 
Female 
1) 15.5 3.0 12.5 4.5 
2) 14.0 8.0 6.0 6.5 
3) 15.0 8.0 7.0 10.0 
4) 19.5 6.0 13.5 7.0 
5) 15.0 6.0 9.0 7.0 
6) 14.0 5.0 9.0 2.5 
7) 15.0 12.0 3.0 10.0 
8) 17.0 t~.o 2.0 12.0 
9) 16.0 8.0 8.0 13.5 
10) 14.5 3.5 11.0 9.0 
11) 13.0 2.5 10.5 9.0 
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Condition 3: Initial Rat.ine of Extrayerted. Additional Information framed as 
Negation 
Eirs! Bat.in 1 Second Ratina Difference Score Li.kt-~islik1 
Male 
1) 7.0 2-t.0 17.0 15.0 
2) :;.:; 19.0 13.:; 7.0 
3) 10.0 2-t.0 1-t.O 9.5 
<f) 8.0 2-t.0 16.0 6.:; 
5) 10.:; 18.5 8.0 12.0 
6) 6.:; 2-t.:; 18.0 19.0 
7) 6.0 16.0 10.0 2.5 
8) 7.:; 2-f.0 16.:; 12.0 
9) 9.0 19.0 10.0 9.0 
10) 11.0 21.0 10.0 11.:; 
Female 
1) 5.5 21.0 15.5 4.5 
2) 9.0 20.0 11.0 12.0 
3) 8.0 22.0 14.0 8.0 
4) 6.5 20.:; 14.0 8.0 
5) 8.5 25.0 16.5 6.0 
6) 9.0 22.0 13.0 15.5 
7) 7.0 12.0 5.0 13.0 
8) 10.0 16.0 6.0 3.0 
9) 7.0 23.0 16.0 10.5 
10) <f .0 20.5 16.5 8.0 
Uf 
Condition :i; Initial Batin& g{Ext.ravuted, Addilig11al lo!armation Fram~d 
Non-neaationally 
First R1tiai1 Second Rltin& Difference Score Like-Di&lik1 
Male 
1) 7.0 18.0 11.0 '4.5 
2) 5.5 20.:; l:>.O 6.0 
3) 10.0 15.0 5.0 5.0 
4) 8.5 21.5 13.0 16.0 
5) 9.0 16.5 7.5 1-4.5 
6) 4.0 1.f.0 10.0 12.5 
7) 2.5 18.5 16.0 11.0 
8) 6.0 23.0 17.0 1-4.:; 
9) 11.0 18.5 7.5 8.0 
10) 7.0 21.5 14.5 11.0 
11) 8.0 20.0 12.0 13.0 
Female 
1) 7.0 8.0 1.0 13.0 
2) .f .0 18.0 14.0 9.5 
3) 12.0 23.0 11.0 5.0 
'4) 9.5 15.5 6.0 3,5 
5) 6.:> 20.0 13.:> 6.0 
6) 2.0 18.0 16.0 13.0 
7) 5.0 21.5 16.5 13.0 
8) 7.5 12.5 5.0 10.0 
9) 3.0 11.0 8.0 13.5 
10) 9.0 23.0 14.0 9.5 
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Raw Data. for Sample 2 of Experiment II 
Condiu2n l: Initi1:l Ratin1 2[ ll11~~lfi1ll. Additi2na1 In!2cmati2n rcuuut u 
Ne1atfon 
first Ratin1 Second Ratin1 Difference Score Like-J2i~i.t§ 
Male 
1) 10.0 19.5 9.5 20.5 
2) 6.5 24.0 17.5 20.0 
3) 10.5 24.0 13.5 21.5 
4) 9.0 24.0 15.0 24.0 
5) 6.0 23.0 17.0 24.0 
6) 6.0 23.0 17.0 20.5 
7) 5.5 19.5 H.0 20.0 
8) 6.0 15.0 9.0 11.0 
9) 8.0 16.0 8.0 11.0 
10) 7.5 15.0 7.5 17.0 
11) 12.0 23.5 11.5 20.0 
12) 6.0 19.5 13.5 18.0 
13) 7.0 9.0 2.0 13.0 
Female 
1) 9.0 22.0 13.0 20.0 
2) 8.5 19.5 11.0 17.0 
3) 5.5 20.0 14.5 20.0 
4) 9.0 19.5 10.5 12.5 
5) 5.0 20.0 15.0 16.0 
6) 9.0 20.0 11.0 21.0 
7) 8.0 25.0 17.0 23.5 
8) 6.0 20.5 14.5 19.0 
9) 8.0 21.0 13.0 2-t.O 
10) 7.0 . 9.0 2.0 5.0 
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Condiuon 2: h1ilJ1l Ratin1 2! Jlnalfi1h. AddiLiQA&l ln!~u:mation fra..m~ul 
Non-negationally 
First Ratin& Second Rating Difference Score Lik~-nillike 
Male 
1) 11.0 20.'.) 9.'.) 22.0 
2) 5.0 16.0 11.0 13.0 
3) 7.0 19.0 12.0 12.0 
4) 6.0 19.5 13.5 22.0 
5) 9.0 23.0 14.0 24.0 
6) 2.0 23.0 21.0 22.5 
7) 9.0 21.0 12.0 17.0 
8) 6.0 25.0 19.0 25.0 
9) 10.0 16.0 6.0 13.0 
10) 8.5 23.0 14.5 20.0 
11) 13.0 15.0 2.0 4.0 
12) 13.0 24.S 11.5 24.S 
Female 
1) 6.S 19.5 13.0 12.S 
2) 12.0 22.0 10.0 24.0 
3) 1.0 19.5 18.5 18.0 
4) 4.0 20.0 16.0 16.0 
') 7.0 4.0 -3.0 3.0 6) 9.5 16.0 6.5 18.0 
7) 4.0 23.5 19.5 23.0 
8) 9.0 23.5 14.5 22.0 
9) 7.S 12.5 5.0 15.5 
10) 1.0 9.5 8.5 12.5 
11) 
'·' 
20., 1,.0 14.0 
12) 9.0 20.0 11.0 24.5 
13) 8.5 19.5 11.0 21.5 
14) 12.0 18.0 6.0 22.0 
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Condition 3; hilLial Ratio& 2r Selfish, Addithulal IA!Kmati211 Framed u 
Ne1ation 
First Ratig,g S1cond Batio.& nurer10.'e s,2n Like-ni1lik1 
Male 
1) 17., '.5.'.5 12.'.5 13.'.5 
2) 18., 2., 16.0 3.0 
3) 19., 3,, 16.0 4.'.5 
'4) 21., 2., 19.0 
'·' ') 18.0 3.0 1,.0 8.0 6) 19.0 6.0 13.0 8., 
7) 21., 1.0 20., 2.0 
8) 19., 21.0 -1., 2.0 
9) 1,.5 7., 8.0 9.0 
10) 21.0 7.0 1-4.0 10.0 
11) 13.0 9.5 3.5 11.0 
12) 13.5 2.0 11.5 2.5 
13) 18.'.5 6.'.5 12.0 9.'.5 
Female 
1) 18.0 '.5.5 12., 7.'.5 
2) 16.5 5,5 11.0 12.5 
3) 19.5 3.0 16.5 3.0 
4) 22.0 11.0 11.0 8.0 
5) H.0 3.0 11.0 7.0 
6) 21.5 3,5 18.0 2.5 
7) 19.0 5.0 H.O 6.0 
8) 18.0 12.0 6.0 13.0 
9) 14.0 5.0 9.0 2.5 
10) 14.0 '.5.0 9.0 6.0 
11) 16.0. 7.0 9.0 7.0 
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Conditi2n ~: Initial Ra:tin& Q[S~lfi~h. Additional ln!tu:mati2n fram~d 
Non-negationa11y 
First Ratin& Second Ratin& Difference Score Like-Dislike 
Male 
1) 18.0 2.0 16.0 -t.0 
2) 15.0 10.0 5.0 6.0 
3) 1-t.0 2.0 12.0 3,5 
4) 13.5 8.5 5.0 10.0 
5) 23.0 41.5 8.5 6.0 
6) 25.0 1.0 241.0 3.0 
7) 19.0 23.0 --t.O 21.0 
8) 16.5 3.0 13.5 3.0 
9) 16.0 12.0 .f.0 10.0 
10) 18.5 6.5 12.0 9.0 
11) 13.0 5.0 8.0 8.5 
Female 
1) 25.0 2-t.0 1.0 20.0 
2) 17.0 6.0 11.0 7.0 
3) 1-t.5 16.0 -1.5 22.0 
•> 18.0 6.0 12.0 8.0 5) 16.0 s.o 11.0 7.0 
6) 18.0 5.5 12.5 7.5 
7) 17.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 
8) 19.5 15.5 -t.0 10.0 
9) 19.5 12.S 7.0 10.0 
10) 13.5 -t.5 9.0 6.0 
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